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I. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
The United States Supreme Court, lower federal courts, Texas courts,
and the state attorney general all rendered decisions during the survey pe-
riod that significantly affect the public's access to government information.
Supreme Court judgments defined the right to observe a criminal trial and
eliminated the constitutional barrier to cameras in the courtroom. Courts
in Texas struggled not only with the question of when a citizen may enter a
courtroom, but also what he may copy from the evidence introduced at
trial. The attorney general responded to numerous inquiries as to whether
government information must be divulged. All things considered, the pub-
lic's rights expanded during the period.
Courtrooms. The press and the public eagerly anticipated the hearing on
an application for writ of habeas corpus in Exparte McManus. I At issue
was the scope of the right of access to court proceedings. The proceedings
in question involved the conduct of the attorneys and witnesses, but ulti-
mately they bore upon the fairness of the defendant's trial. The defense
attorney was accused of having an affair with McManus's wife during trial.
Subsequently he married her. McManus further alleged that one of the
prosecutors was having an affair with a key state witness during the trial
and suborned perjury of that witness. The court of criminal appeals later
characterized these claims as allegations of "extracurricular activities of
lawyers and witnesses during the trial."'2 Without motion from any party
and over the objection of all parties, the district court determined that the
"extracurricular activities" should be aired in a hearing closed to the press
and public. The ruling of the trial judge was based in part upon the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,3 in which
the Court upheld the closure of a pretrial suppression hearing.4 In Mc-
Manus the Houston Chronicle and one of its reporters, the Houston Post,
* A.B., Brown University; J.D., Boston University. Attorney at Law, Jackson,
Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
** A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Locke, Pur-
nell, Boren, Laney & Neely, Dallas, Texas.
1. No. 249,771 (Dist. Ct. of Harris County, 179th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Apr. 28,
1980).
2. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. McMaster, 598 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980).
3. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
4. Id. at 394.
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Channel 2 Television, and KPRC Radio petitioned the district court to
open the habeas corpus proceedings. The judge denied their motion. The
press representatives then petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
for a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition.
In Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. McMaster5 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals ruled that the trial judge should not have closed the
habeas corpus proceeding.6 The court relied upon the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, stating that article 1.247 plainly and unequivocally
requires that "[tlhe proceedings and trials in all courts shall be public." '8
Judge Clinton's majority opinion stated that a hearing on an application
for writ of habeas corpus clearly was a "proceeding" under the statute's
purview and, thus, the trial court was not authorized to close the hearing. 9
The court further ruled that in this case the district court had no authority
even to hold a habeas corpus hearing because McManus's pending appeal
in the United States Supreme Court, from his conviction on the merits,
supplanted the trial court's role. 10 The court of criminal appeals, thus, de-
nied the petition for a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition."
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Dally, joined by Presid-
ing Judge Onion and Judge Douglas, chided the majority for issuing what
they called a declaratory judgment.' 2 Judge Dally objected to the court's
needless decision as to whether proceedings properly brought under the
provisions of article 11.07 could be closed to the public. ' 3 The concurring
opinion agreed with the majority that the trial court had no authority to
close the habeas corpus proceeding, but it objected to the majority's enter-
ing of an advisory opinion when it was clear that the trial court had no
authority to conduct the proceeding.14
The court of criminal appeals expressly declined to decide whether the
press had any right under the state or federal constitutions to attend the
habeas corpus proceedings.' 5 Because the issue was not raised, the court
also did not decide whether opening the proceeding would jeopardize the
defendant's constitutional right to due process or a fair trial. At the time
of the hearing, McManus had joined the press and the prosecutor in seek-
ing to conduct the proceedings in public.' 6
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of access to court-
rooms in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 17 During the prior term
5. 598 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
6. Id. at 867.
7. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.24 (Vernon 1977).
8. Id. (emphasis added); 598 S.W.2d at 866.
9. 598 S.W.2d at 866-67.
10. Id. at 867-68.




15. Id. at 866.
16. Id. at 864 n.l.
17. 100 S. Ct. 2814, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1980).
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the Court had decided Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,18 which upheld a New
York trial judge's exclusion of the press and the public from a pretrial
suppression hearing in a murder case. Justice Stewart's majority opinion
in Gannett had created confusion and controversy in the courts below.
The Court had held that a judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to
minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity and that "[c]losure of
pretrial proceedings is often one of the most effective methods that a trial
judge can employ" to fulfill that duty.' 9 According to the Court, the sixth
amendment's provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial benefits the defendant, not the press or the public. 20 The
Court pointed out, however, that the defendant does not enjoy a sixth
amendment right to compel a closed trial.2' Assuming, without deciding,
that the first amendment grants the public and press a qualified right of
access to pretrial hearings, the Court stated that the trial judge below had
given appropriate deference to that right.22 The Court did not decide
whether a state constitution could prohibit closure of pretrial suppression
hearings.
In the five-month period following the Gannett decision, the Reporters'
Committee for Freedom of the Press identified 109 efforts to close court-
rooms. According to the committee, some closure was granted in sixty-one
of the cases. The efforts were not confined to pretrial suppression hearings,
but included trials and postrial proceedings as in McManus.
23
Almost immediately, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,24 a case involving the criminal trial
of a man accused of murdering a motel clerk in 1975. The defendant was
convicted of the crime in July 1976, but the Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed his conviction. 25 Two mistrials followed.26 Prior to the fourth
trial, the defendant's attorney moved to close the entire proceeding to the
public and the press, citing potential prejudicial publicity. Without a hear-
ing, the trial court granted the motion. The case went to trial and the
accused was acquitted. 27 Two Richmond reporters, however, had objected
to the closure and appealed the court's ruling. The United States Supreme
Court reversed in a seven-to-one decision.
28
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion for the first time found an ex-
press right of access to government proceedings, including trials, rooted in
the first amendment speech, press, and assembly clauses.29 The Chief Jus-
18. 433 U.S. 368 (1979).
19. Id. at 378-79.
20. Id. at 379-80.
21. Id. at 382.
22. Id. at 392.
23. THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW, Nov./Dec. 1979, at 17.
24. 100 S. Ct. 2814, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1980).
25. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 779 (1977).
26. See 100 S. Ct. at 2818, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 978.
27. See id. at 2820, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 980.
28. Id. at 2830, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 992-93.
29. Id. at 2828, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 989-90.
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tice cautioned, however, that the first amendment rights of the public and
the press are not absolute and he reserved judgment as to whether a first
amendment right to attend civil trials exists.30 In a concurring opinion,
however, Justice Stevens called Richmond Newspapers a "watershed
case."'31 "Never before," he wrote, had the Court held "that the acquisi-
tion of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection what-
soever."' 32 To the contrary, prior decisions had suggested that the press
clause provided no greater right of access for the press than the general
public. 33 Future litigation likely will determine whether the first amend-
ment right of access is confined solely to criminal trials or whether it is
extended to other government proceedings and facilities.
Courtroom Evidence. During the survey period, the United States Justice
Department procured a number of indictments against elected officials and
others pursuant to the ABSCAM and Brilab investigations. The latter in-
vestigation resulted in the indictment of the Speaker of the Texas House of
Representatives, Billy Clayton, along with three nongovernment individu-
als. Representative Clayton was indicted and charged with wire fraud,
conspiracy, use of interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises,
and conspiracy to commit extortion. He was charged with an additional
count of attempted extortion, and the other defendants were accused of
aiding and abetting that offense. The government's exhibits included audi-
otape recordings purportedly indicating that Clayton had committed the
offenses. The recordings were introduced into evidence at the criminal
trial.34 During the trial, Belo Broadcasting Corporation, licensee of televi-
sion station WFAA in Dallas, filed suit to obtain contemporaneous access
to the tapes that had been introduced into evidence. 35 Following the trial,
a second Dallas station, KDFW Television, and a KDFW reporter peti-
tioned the court to permit them to inspect and copy the tapes.36 District
Judge Robert O'Conor, Jr. denied the requests, basing this refusal upon
two grounds: (1) the press had been afforded preferential access to the
Clayton trial, had heard the tapes, and had been permitted to review and
retain transcripts of the taped conversations; and (2) release of the tapes
would prejudice the right of the yet-to-be tried severed defendant to a fair
trial and to due process of law. 37 Both broadcasting stations appealed this
30. Id. at 2829 n.17, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 992 n.17.
31. Id. at 2830, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 993.
32. Id.
33. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978); Saxbe v. The Washington
Post, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); BeVier, An In-
formed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 482, 490 (1980).
34. A jury subsequently found Representative Clayton and two other defendants inno-
cent. The fourth defendant had been severed from the trial.
35. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, No. H-80-2320 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 1980).
36. United States v. Clayton, No. H-80-74-S (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1980).
37. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, No. H-80-2320, slip op. at 1-2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16,
1980). KDFW's petition for hearing and for vacation of restrictions on press and other news
media was denied by Judge O'Conor on Nov. 7, 1980, based on his earlier order in Belo
[Vol. 35
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
ruling. The Fifth Circuit has granted expedited review of the question.
Judge O'Conor's ruling is at odds with the approach taken by the Sec-
ond Circuit with respect to access to the ABSCAM videotapes. 38 There the
court found a presumptive common law right to inspect and copy judicial
records, thus affirming the lower court's permission to the television net-
works to do so with the ABSCAM videotapes.39 The court disagreed that
the ABSCAM defendants shown on the tapes who were awaiting trial
would be prejudiced by publication of the tapes. 40
Access to Governmental Records. During the survey period, no court cases
construing the Texas Open Records Act 4' were decided, but the attorney
general handed down several important decisions. An interesting question
presented in ORD-246 was whether the city of Dallas could disclose tax
information involving approximately 60,000 persons to whom confidenti-
ality had been promised. The Dallas Times Herald sought access to cer-
tain summary information contained in the city of Dallas's "business,
personal property tax returns." On the face of those returns was a promise
of confidentiality to the taxpayers. However, unless the records are exempt
from disclosure under the Open Records Act, the promise of confidential-
ity carries with it no force and effect under Texas law.42 The city recog-
nized this fact, but argued that the tax returns might contain certain trade
secrets or proprietary information. Dallas suggested that the individual
businesses should be notified so that, if they desired, they could make a
showing of competitive harm to the attorney general and, thus, demon-
strate the applicability of one of the Act's exemptions. 43 The Times Her-
ald took the position that the Open Records Act prohibits notification to
Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, No. H-80-2320 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 1980). United States v.
Clayton, No. H-80-74S (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1980).
38. In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., No. 80-1345 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 1980).
39. Id., slip op. at 5957, 5962-63.
40. Id. at 5965.
41. For a review of cases filed under the federal Freedom of Information Act during the
survey period, see Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1979,
1980 DUKE L.J. 139. For treatment of related problems, see Comment, Exemptions to the
Sunshine Law and the Public Records Law- Have They Impaired Open Government in Flor-
ida?, 8 FLA ST. L. REV. 265 (1980); Comment, News Media Access to Executive Sessions
Under Oregon's Open Meeting Law, 58 OR. L. REv. 521 (1980); Note, Sealing and Expunge-
ment of Criminal Records.- Avoiding the Inevitable Social Stigma, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1087
(1979); Note, The "Open Door" Laws: An Appraisal of Open Meeting Legislation in Indiana,
14 VAL. U.L. REV. 295 (1980).
42. See Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex.
1976); TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. Nos. H-1070 (1977), H-258 (1974); TEX. Ar'vy GEN. ORDS-
95, -46, -29 (1974), -8 (1973).
43. The Texas Open Records Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon
Supp. 1980-1981), exempts disclosure of trade secrets and commercial or financial informa-
tion made confidential by statute or judicial decision. See id. § 3(a)(10). The attorney gen-
eral has ruled, however, that this exemption is no broader than the exemption in § 3(a)(1),
which exempts information deemed confidential by law, be it constitutional or statutory, or
by judicial opinion. See TEX. ATT'y GEN. ORD-233 (1980). The attorney general also has
held, in that same opinion, that the exemption in § 3(a)(10) is considerably more narrow
than its counterpart in the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
See TEx. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-233 (1980).
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the taxpayer or his waiver of objection as a condition precedent to the
release of the information. Section 14(b) provides that "[tihis Act does not
authorize the withholding of information or limit the availability of public
records to the public, except as expressly so provided.""4 The Act provides
for no notification program.
In ORD-24645 the attorney general ruled that the city of Dallas must
release the business property tax rendition forms as they were not ex-
empted from disclosure under any portion of the Open Records Act.46
The attorney general further ruled that, assuming that an affected party,
such as a taxpayer, had a right to object to the release of the information,
the right had been waived in this case because supposedly identical tax
information had been provided to a coordinate taxing authority, Dallas
County.47 The county tax assessor-collector did not receive the informa-
tion upon a promise of confidentiality and had freely disseminated the in-
formation to any requesting party under the Open Records Act.
It is, thus, unclear what rights, if any, a party affected by release of infor-
mation has under the Open Records Act. In parallel situations, courts
have held that an affected party has no standing to object to the release of
information. That was the conclusion of the United States Supreme Court
when it construed the federal Freedom of Information Act in Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown .48 A similar construction has been placed on the Califor-
nia Public Record Act. 49 The custodian of the sought-after records, how-
ever, may assert objections to disclosure. That was the conclusion of the
Texas Supreme Court in Industrial Foundation v. Texas IndustrialAccident
Board,50 where the court held that the custodian could raise the privacy
interest of a party mentioned in the records even though the custodian
would not have standing to do so in a normal lawsuit. 5'
The attorney general issued several other opinions under the Open
Records Act during the survey period. In ORD-22852 the attorney general
ruled that records of the North Texas Commission are public under the
Open Records Act because the commission receives funds from several
public entities and has entered into contract with these entities.5 3 In an-
other opinion the University of Houston claimed that the federal Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act 54 prohibited a student from obtaining
44. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 14(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
45. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-246 (1980).
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 2-3.
48. 441 U.S. 281, 292-93 (1979). The United States Supreme Court held that a party
wishing to contest release of information could challenge the federal agency's action under
the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally Note, Reverse FOIA Suits After Chrysler.- 4
New Direction, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 185 (1979).
49. Los Angeles Police Dep't v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 661, 668, 135 Cal. Rptr.
575, 579 (1977).
50. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
51. Id. at 678.
52. TEx. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-228 (1979).
53. Id. at 2.
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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direct access to his or her medical records under the Texas Open Records
Act. The attorney general in ORD-22955 disagreed and ruled that the
Open Records Act did not conflict with the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act, and furthermore that section 14(e) of the Texas Act 56 did
not exempt this information from disclosure.57
The Fort Worth Star-Telegram published a series of articles charging
misapplication of services and materials by certain administrative employ-
ees of the Fort Worth Independent School District. As a result of these
charges, the school board directed its attorneys to conduct an extensive
investigation into the matter. The attorneys, after interviewing witnesses
and obtaining statements and affidavits, submitted a report to the school
board. Following receipt of the report, the board made the statement that
"there is no evidence to support the charges and allegations made by a
Star-Telegram reporter regarding the serious misuse of Fort Worth In-
dependent School District materials and employees for personal benefit." 58
The executive editor of the Star-Telegram filed an Open Records Act re-
quest seeking a number of items including the written report by the attor-
neys and copies of the tapes and written statements of the witnesses. The
attorney general ruled in ORD-230 59 that the factual report of the attor-
ney, the affidavits of four administrators whose conduct was at issue, and
copies of checks held by the school district as payment for supplies and
labor were public and should be disclosed.60 The attorney general further
stated that the tapes, transcripts, affidavits, and sworn statements of per-
sons other than those on whom the investigation was focused were ex-
cepted from public disclosure under section 3(a)(1) of the Act.61 This is
the so-called "informer's" privilege, "encouraging persons to report possi-
ble misconduct without their identity being disclosed." 62
In ORD-23163 the Texas Department of Human Resources sought to
determine whether production of computer-output-microfilm could be
done more economically by the state rather than by an independent con-
tractor. The study concluded that in-house production would be more eco-
nomical. The corporation that had been providing the services sought to
see the feasibility study. The attorney general concluded that the report
contained factual information and, thus, was not entitled to protection
under the intra-agency memorandum exemption of section 3(a)(l 1).64 Fur-
ther, the attorney general stated that the report was not made privileged or
55. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-229 (1979).
56. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 14(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
57. TEX. Arr'v GEN. ORD-229, at 3.
58. TEX. ATr' GEN. ORD-230, at 2 (1979).
59. TEX. AT'Y GEN. ORD-230 (1979).
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
62. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-230, at 5. The informer's privilege generally is confined to
law enforcement agencies. This attorney general opinion represents an extension of the
privilege to a nonlaw enforcement context.
63. TEX. AT-r'Y GEN. ORD-231 (1979).
64. Id. at 2-3; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(l 1) (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981).
19811
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL
confidential by statute or judicial decision.65 Some of the information in
the report had come from a private corporation that had given the Depart-
ment of Human Resources the report in confidence; nevertheless, the attor-
ney general held that the information must be disclosed.66
In ORD-23267 four firms submitted bids on a general construction con-
tract to build the Gibbons Creek Steam Electric Station. The successful
bidder and one other bidder sought to review the various proposals sub-
mitted to the Texas Municipal Power Agency. One of the bidders objected
to the agency's production of the materials. It claimed that exemptions
3(a)(4) and 3(a)(10) 68 prohibited disclosure of the information.69 The at-
torney general ruled that the information was not a trade secret and that
there had been no showing of harm to competitive position; accordingly, it
ordered production of the material. 70 Similarly, in ORD-233 71 the attor-
ney general decided that monthly rental figures paid by car rental agencies
at the city airport in Lubbock, Texas were not exempted under sections
3(a)(4) or 3(a)(10) of the Act.72
The attorney general ruled in ORD-234 73 that so long as good faith ne-
gotiations by the city of Lubbock regarding purchase of a particular tract
of property were incomplete, the city could withhold proposed plans, loca-
tions, and cost estimates relating to a proposed reservoir and water line
project under section 3(a)(5) of that Act. 74 In ORD-235 75 the attorney
general concluded that the identity of a named employing unit and the
partners in such employing unit, information that is obtained under the
authority of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act,76 is not exempt
from disclosure under the Open Records Act.77
The Open Records Act does not apply to the judiciary.78 In ORD-23679
the attorney general was asked to decide whether files indicating whether
probationers are complying with the terms of their probation are judicial
records. The attorney general decided that because probation officers are
employed by a district judge and subject to his supervision and control, the
officers' records are records of the judiciary and are not subject to the
65. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-231, at 3.
66. Id.
67. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-232 (1979).
68. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 3(a)(4), (10) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
69. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-232, at 1.
70. Id. at 4.
71. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-233 (1980).
72. Id. at 2.
73. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-234 (1980).
74. Id. at 1; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
75. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-235 (1980).
76. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-1 to -24 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp.
1971-1980).
77. Id. at 2.
78. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 2(1)(G) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
79. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-236 (1980).
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Open Records Act. 80
A member of the legislature filed a request for records of the Emergency
Medical Service system of the El Paso city-county health unit. The re-
quested records related to emergency medical treatment and transporta-
tion to a hospital of persons who had given birth under the care of lay
midwives. The legislator asked that the names of the patients not be de-
leted. In ORD-237 81 the attorney general ruled that this information was
protected by a common law or constitutional right of privacy and, thus,
was exempt from disclosure. 82 Deciding that the special right of access
afforded legislators by sections 3(b) and 14(c)83 did not extend to informa-
tion excepted from disclosure by statute or common law, the attorney gen-
eral denied disclosure. 84
In ORD-23885 information disclosing the specific location of registered
bee yards in a county was excepted from required public disclosure. The
attorney general ruled that the names and addresses of those persons who
registered their bee yards in a particular county should be disclosed, but
agreed that the location of the bee yards was a trade secret. 86 The attorney
general reasoned that disclosure would impair the ability of the state ento-
mologist to obtain information on a voluntary basis, which is necessary to
carry out his inspection program of bee yards.87
In ORD-239 88 the attorney general decided that a college president's
recommendations to the board of regents regarding faculty tenure are ex-
cepted from disclosure under the intra-agency memorandum section of the
Act. 89 This exception also was employed to compel disclosure in ORD-
240.90 The department of banking was investigating allegations that a
member of the legislature had been involved in the manipulation of securi-
ties pledged as collateral for a bank loan. The attorney general, however,
ruled that one document, a letter from the department to the legislator,
assuring him that he was not the subject of an investigation by the state
banking board or the department of banking, should be disclosed. 91
ORD-24192 built upon the important decision in ORD-212. 93 Both re-
quests involved disclosure of information gathered by the Governor re-
garding potential nominees for public office. ORD-212 concluded that
documents disclosing the identity of a person who has recommended an-
80. Id. at 2.
81. TEX. Arr'y GEN. ORD-237 (1980).
82. Id. at I.
83. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(b), 14(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
84. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-237, at 2.
85. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-238 (1980).
86. Id. at 3-4.
87. Id.
88. TEX. Arr'y GEN. ORD-239 (1980).
89. Id. at 2; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1 1) (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981).
90. TEX. AT'Y GEN. ORD-240 (1980).
91. Id. at 2.
92. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-241 (1980).
93. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-212 (1978).
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other for appointment by the Governor, or documents reflecting that a per-
son has recommended himself for appointment, are not excepted from
disclosure per se.94 In ORD-241 the attorney general considered two re-
quests, one of which asked for "copies of all correspondence, telegrams,
telephone memorandum, etc., that pertain to recommendations to fill ex-
pected vacancies on the Supreme Court of Texas. ' '95 The second request
sought memos of telephone calls in which persons were recommended for
a vacancy on the public utilities commission as well as other records of
communications regarding prospective nominees.96 The attorney general
reiterated his decision that records maintained by the Governor that reveal
recommendations of persons for appointment to public office are not ex-
cepted from disclosure per se.97 He went on to rule that documents that
contain derrogatory, largely unverified information contained in informal
background checks of prospective appointees are not required to be re-
vealed. 98 The attorney general held, however, that neither a memorandum
to the file listing names of persons recommended for appointment to par-
ticular positions by other persons, nor an application from an individual
listing a number of appointive positions he would accept is exempt from
disclosure. 99 The filing consisted of two letters from persons applying for
appointment to particular positions. The attorney general concluded that
whether any particular document is required to be released will be deter-
mined in light of the test established by the Texas Supreme Court; that is,
whether the information disclosed includes highly intimate or embarrass-
ing facts, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a rea-
sonable person and in which the public has no legitimate interest. 100
In ORD-24210 the student newspaper at Texas A&M University sub-
mitted a list of parking permit numbers and requested that the university
furnish names of the students to whom the numbers were assigned. The
university contended that it was precluded from releasing this information
under the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.10 2 The at-
torney general agreed that the federal law applied, but found that an ex-
ception was provided for "directory information."1 0 3 Consequently, he
classified the requested information as "directory information" and or-
dered disclosure, stating that "[ajny student record which could be treated
as directory information under federal law must be accorded that status
unless its release would as a matter of law constitute an invasion of any
94. Id. at 4.
95. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-241, at 1.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 4; see Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668,
684-85 (Tex. 1976).
101. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-242 (1980).
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
103. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-242, at 1; see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5) (1976 & Supp. III
1979); 45 C.F.R. § 99.37(c) (1979).
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person's right of privacy."'04 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act 10 5 also was at issue in ORD-244.10 6 There the requestor sought names
of each student enrolled in certain courses currently offered at Ranger Jun-
ior College. The attorney general concluded that the information re-
quested reasonably could constitute "directory information" and, thus,
was disclosable under the Open Records Act. 0 7
In ORD-24310 8 the requestor sought certain lists of persons arrested and
convicted of prostitution and public lewdness. The Dallas city attorney
stated that the Dallas Police Department did not maintain such lists. The
attorney general stated that the well-established rule is that an agency is
not required to compile or extract information if it can be made available
by allowing the requestor access to the existing records.' 0 9 Because all this
information was available from the daily police blotter and court records,
the attorney general ruled that the police were not required to organize the
data. 110
In ORD-24511 the attorney general concluded that the terms of a settle-
ment agreement on an equal employment claim were available under the
Open Records Act. 1 2 The ruling rejected the contention that the settle-
ment agreement was deemed confidential by law. 1 3 It also declined to
find the information exempt under the personnel files exception 1 4 or the
litigation exception 15 to the Open Records Act."
16
In ORD-24711 7 the attorney general decided whether the names and ad-
dresses of retired appellate judges should be available to the public. He
concluded that this information was made confidential by statutory law. 118
In ORD-248119 the city attorney of Dallas contended that draft docu-
ments of proposed municipal ordinances and resolutions prepared by the
city's staff study group were exempt from disclosure. The attorney general
agreed, applying section 3(a)(6) of the Open Records Act, which exempts
"drafts and working papers involved in the preparation of proposed legis-
lation." 120
In ORD-249121 the attorney general decided whether a ranking of per-
104. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-242, at 2.
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
106. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-244 (1980).
107. Id. at 2.
108. TEX. Arr'y GEN. ORD-243 (1980).
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id. at 1-2.
111. TEX. Arr'y GEN. ORD-245 (1980).
112. Id. at 2.
113. Id. at 1-2.
114. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
115. Id. § 3(a)(3).
116. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-245, at 2.
!17. TEX. ATrr'y GEN. ORD-247 (1980).
118. Id. at 2; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6228k, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
119. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-248 (1980).
120. Id. at 2; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
121. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-249 (1980).
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sons recommended for employment by a city is public information. The
information requested was used in selecting persons to fill vacancies in the
various departments of municipal government. The requestor informed
the attorney general that he was particularly interested in determining
whether members of minority groups had applied for any of the city posi-
tions. The attorney general ruled that the completed "appointment and
promotion request" ranking the top applicants is excepted from disclo-
sure; however, where the form reflects the fact that no members of minor-
ity groups have applied for a position, the requestor is entitled to examine
that portion of the form.' 22
Information pertaining to the sale of hospitals owned by county hospital
authorities was requested in ORD-250. 23 The Texas Commissioner of
Health contended that article 4437f, section 15124 made the information
requested confidential. The attorney general ruled that the disclosure
should be made as to whether any hospital owned by a county hospital
authority had been sold to a proprietary hospital company, but that the
identity of the authority selling the hospital should not be revealed. 25
In ORD-25 1126 the attorney general was asked whether accident reports
prepared by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) as part of its
internal investigation of accidents involving DPS vehicles were public
under the Act. Applying the exemption contained in section 3(a)( 1), 127
the attorney general concluded that if the information would not be ob-
tainable in discovery in civil litigation then it must be exempted from dis-
closure under the Act.' 28 After consideration of rule 167 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, he ruled that the information requested would
not be discoverable in a civil suit and, therefore, was exempt. 29
ORD-252 30 considered whether closed investigation files in murder
cases are available to the public. The attorney general concluded that the
names and statements of witnesses in the case could be withheld where
disclosure might subject them to harassment or harm their cooperation
with law enforcement officers.' 3 1 The attorney general ruled, however,
that the balance of the files should be released. 132
In ORD-253133 the attorney general concluded that a list of the amount
of teacher retirement funds paid to individual employees should be made
available for the use of the legislature so long as the information disclosed
122. Id. at 2.
123. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-250 (1980).
124. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4437f, § 15 (Vernon 1976).
125. TEX. ATlr'y GEN. ORD-250, at 1-2.
126. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-251 (1980).
127. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(11) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
128. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-251, at 2.
129. Id. at 3-4.
130. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-252 (1980).
131. Id. at 4-5.
132. Id. at 5.
133. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-253 (1980).
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does not furnish a basis for identification of the individual retirees. 134 In
another brief ruling, the attorney general decided that the county clerk was
required to disclose information on applications for marriage licenses, in-
cluding the applicants' full names, addresses, social security numbers, and
dates and places of birth, as no exemption to disclosure existed. ' 35 Finally,
in ORD-255136 proposals submitted by consultants seeking a contract with
a government body were ruled to be available under the Act. 137 Although
the attorney general stated that lists of customers contained in the bid pro-
posals may be withheld, he ruled that the balance of the proposals were
public. 138
Open Meetings Act. Only one case decided during the survey period con-
strued the Texas Open Meetings Act. 139 In Bowen v. Calallen Independent
School District'4 ° the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals considered
whether the Act prohibited a school board's dismissal of a teacher when
the action was taken in executive session. The court noted that the Texas
Open Meetings Act unqualifiedly prohibited the school board from dis-
cussing a teacher's dismissal in closed session over that teacher's objec-
tion.' 4 ' In this case, however, because the teacher did not object to the
executive session, the court held that he waived his rights under the Open
Meetings Act to have his employment status discussed in public. 142
Cameras in the Courtroom. Texas currently provides for audio or visual
recording of appellate proceedings with the consent of the presiding
judge, 143 and, in certain limited instances, provides for the similar record-
ing of trial proceedings with the consent of the parties.144 More than half
of the states have some legislation permitting the recording of trials, in-
cluding criminal proceedings. Perhaps the leading jurisdiction is Florida,
which has initiated a pilot program for televising trials. During the survey
period, the United States Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the
presence of electronic media in the courtroom violates a criminal defend-
ant's right to a fair and impartial trial. The case, Chandler v. Florida,45
concerned two former Miami policemen who were convicted of burglariz-
ing a restaurant. A Florida appellate court affirmed their convictions,
holding that no evidence existed to show that the defendants had been
134. Id. at 2.
135. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-254, at 1 (1980).
136. TEX. ATrr'Y GEN. ORD-255 (1980).
137. Id. at 3.
138. Id.
139. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
140. 603 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
141. Id. at 236.
142. Id.
143. State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon No. 3A(7)(d), TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 app. (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
144. Id., Canon No. 3A(7)(c).
145. 49 U.S.L.W. 4141 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1981).
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hampered by the televising of the proceeding. 46 The Florida Supreme
Court refused to hear the appeal, 47 noting that it had fully considered the
constitutional questions surrounding camera coverage when it adopted
new court rules in April 1979.148 The United States Supreme Court, in an
eight-to-zero decision, 49 held that televising these proceedings did not vio-
late the Constitution in view of the defendants' failure to show prejudice to
their fair trial rights.' 50
II. ELECTION LAW
The Voting Rights Act and Constitutional Litigation. In United States v.
Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District'5' the Fifth Circuit de-
cided two important questions under the federal Voting Rights Act.' 52
First, it held that following a 1975 amendment, section 2 of the Act' 53
covers purposeful discrimination in at-large election schemes. 154 Secondly,
it decided that the term "state or political subdivision," as used in section
2, includes a school board. 155 The court expressly chose not to address a
third question, whether section 2 now forbids vote dilution in at-large elec-
tion schemes when no allegation or evidence of purposeful discrimination
is presented.156
The attorney general brought suit against the Uvalde school district
under the Act, alleging that the at-large system of electing representatives
to the local school board was implemented with the intent and purpose of
causing irreparable injury to Mexican-American voters by effectively and
purposefully precluding them from meaningful access to the political pro-
cess. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, hold-
ing that section 2 does not itself prohibit at-large school board elections. 157
On appeal the school district urged a second ground for sustaining the trial
146. 366 So. 2d 64, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
147. 376 So. 2d 1157, 1157 (Fla. 1979).
148. Id.; see Petition of the Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 781-
82 (Fla 1979).
149. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
150. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4147. It was a Texas case that originally led to the banning of televi-
sion cameras from the courtroom. In 1964 the United States Supreme Court ruled that Billy
Sol Estes had been deprived of a fair trial by the presence of cameras while his case was
being heard. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
151. 625 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
153. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to
deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
1973b(f)(2) [which prohibits any denial or abridgment of the right to vote be-
cause the voter is a member of a language minority group].
Id. § 1973 (1976).
154. 625 F.2d at 554.
155. Id. at 556.
156. Id. at 554 n.12.
157. United States v. Uvalde Consol. Independent School Dist., 461 F. Supp. 117, 122-23
(W.D. Tex. 1978).
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court, arguing that a school board is not a "state or political subdivision"
within the meaning of section 2.
The school board also argued that section 2 does not cover the dilution
of voting rights even when a claim of discriminatory purpose is made. The
board contended that section 2 does not deal with every voting standard,
practice, or procedure, but rather is limited to voting procedures that deny
someone the right to vote. The school board relied heavily upon the
United States Supreme Court's plurality opinion in City of Mobile v.
Bolden.158 In that case the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that
Mobile, Alabama's at-large system of elections did not operate to discrimi-
nate against black voters in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. 159 Six Justices wrote opinions in Bolden, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit in the Uvalde decision characterized the plurality opinion as ambigu-
ous.' 60 Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that when all the
Bolden dissenting and concurring opinions were considered as a whole, "it
is clear that a majority of the court believes that a fifteenth amendment
claim can be made out against vote-diluting at-large districting if discrimi-
natory purpose is proved."' 6 ' Accordingly, in Uvalde the Fifth Circuit
wrote that "at-large districting may result in substantial dilution of a mi-
nority vote and therefore constitute unconstitutional infringement of the
right to vote if discriminatory purpose is shown."' 162 The court reversed
and remanded the case, holding that a section 2 claim had been stated by
the government. 163
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the school district's claim that it was not
a "state or political subdivision" within the meaning of the Act. 164 In do-
ing so, the court harmonized an apparent conflict between two recent
United States Supreme Court decisions. In United States v. Board of Com-
missioners165 the Court held that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,' 66
which requires a "state or political subdivision" to clear voting changes
with the Justice Department prior to their implementation, applied to
Sheffield, Alabama, a municipality that did not register voters and, there-
fore, was not a state, county, or registration unit. 167 Under section 14(c)(2)
of the Act,' 68 the term "political subdivision" means "any county or par-
ish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivi-
sion of a State which conducts registration for voting."'169 The school dis-
158. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
159. Id. at 61-65.
160. 625 F.2d at 552.
161. Id. at 552 n.8.
162. Id. at 552.
163. Id. at 556.
164. Id.
165. 435 U.S. 110 (1978).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
167. 435 U.S. at 135.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1973/(c)(2) (1976).
169. Id.
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trict claimed that because it was not a county and did not register voters, it
was not a political subdivision as defined by section 14(c)(2). The Court in
United States v. Board of Commissioners rejected that type of argument for
section 5 purposes. In City of Rome v. United States, 170 however, the Court
concluded that the provisions of section 4(a) of the Act,17 1 which permit a
state or political subdivision to avoid provisions of the Act by bringing a
suit to establish that it has not discriminated in the past, do not apply to a
municipality. 172 The Fifth Circuit, thus, was faced with the task of decid-
ing whether "state or political subdivision" as used in section 2 should be
used broadly as in United States v. Board of Commissioners,173 or whether
a narrow reading was required as in Rome. Relying upon legislative in-
tent, the Fifth Circuit held that "[iln our opinion Congress intended to
forbid racial, color and language minority discrimination in all of the myr-
iad elections reached by section 2." 174 The Court concluded that a school
board is a political subdivision for section 2 purposes. 75
In Sanchez v. McDaniel176 the Fifth Circuit held that a proposed reap-
portionment plan submitted by a local legislative body does not lose its
status as a legislative rather than a court-ordered plan merely because it is
the product of litigation conducted in a federal forum. 177 Legislative plans
under the Voting Rights Act must be submitted for clearance to the Justice
Department in certain situations; however, court-ordered plans need not
obtain clearance. 78 In 1968 the United States District Court in Kleburg
County, Texas, determined that the county apportionment plan violated
the constitutional principle of one man, one vote. 179 The Kleburg County
commissioners' court was ordered to submit a proposed reapportionment
plan to the district court. 180 Following this order, the commissioners' court
employed a consultant to formulate a plan that subsequently was adopted
by and submitted to the district court. The district court reviewed the pro-
posed reapportionment plan and approved it for use in the 1980 primary
and general elections. 181 Under these facts, the Fifth Circuit held that the
proposed reapportionment plan submitted to the district court was subject
to the clearance provisions of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.' 8 2 It
therefore vacated the decision of the district court, which had considered,
170. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1976).
172. 446 U.S. at 167.
173. 435 U.S. 110, 117-18 (1978). See also Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439
U.S. 32, 43-47 (1978) (county board of education is a "political subdivision" within purview
of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, even though it does not conduct elections, because it
"has the power to affect candidate participation in ... elections").
174. 625 F.2d at 556.
175. Id.
176. 615 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1980).
177. Id. at 1024.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
179. See 615 F.2d at 1024.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Id; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
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on its own, the constitutionality of the proposed plan.183
Watson v. Commissioners Court184 involved an unusual situation in
which an election was to-be held pursuant to a 1965 reapportionment plan
that all parties seemed to agree was unconstitutional. The trial court had
ruled, however, that it would be impracticable to reapportion until after
the 1980 census had been completed. 185 Thus, the district court refused to
enjoin a May 30, 1980 primary election of members of the commissioners'
court. 186 It ordered a reapportionment plan to be submitted to the court
within 180 days of receipt of the official results of the 1980 population
census. 8 7 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the equitable powers of
the court should have been invoked to enjoin the primary election and to
formulate an equitable apportionment plan.188 The court ordered that re-
sult. 189
Two district court cases decided during the survey period considered
whether the seeking of elective office could result in a dismissal or forced
resignation from government employment. In Stone v. City of Wichita
Falls 90 the plaintiff, Stone, a Wichita Falls fireman, became a candidate
for county commissioner in Archer County. Stone was dismissed for vio-
lating a city service rule and the city charter, which stated that any "em-
ployee of the City who shall become a candidate for election to any office
shall forfeit the office or employment held under the City." '191 The court
invalidated the city charter provision, holding that it conflicted with state
statutory and constitutional law and the first amendment to the Constitu-
tion. ' 92
In Fashing v. Moore 193 the court considered a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of article III, section 19194 and article XVI, section 65195 of the
183. 615 F.2d at 1024.
184. 616 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980).
185. Id. at 105-06.
186. Id. at 106.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 107.
189. Id.
190. 477 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
191. Id. at 583 n.2.
192. Id. at 585.
193. 489 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
194. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 19 provides:
No judge of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General, clerk of any court
of record, or any person holding a lucrative office under the United States, or
this State, or any foreign government shall during the term of which he is
elected or appointed, be eligible to the Legislature.
195. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 65 provides:
[I]f any of the officers named herein shall announce their candidacy, or shall
in fact become a candidate, in any General, Special or Primary Election, for
any office of profit or trust under the laws of this State or the United States
other than the office then held, at any time when the unexpired term of the
office then held shall exceed one (1) year, such announcement or such candi-
dacy shall constitute an automatic resignation of the office then held, and the
vacancy thereby created shall be filled pursuant to law in the same manner as
other vacancies for such office are filled.
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Texas Constitution. The district court held that article XVI, section 65
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 96
While conceding that important government interests were served by the
provision, the court concluded that the classification embodied in section
65 was not reasonably necessary to vindicate those interests.' 97 It also
found the classifications in article III, section 19 to be invidiously discrimi-
natory. 98 The court concluded that both provisions were unconstitu-
tional. 199
Gamza v. Aguirre2°° involved a dispute between two candidates for a
position on the board of the El Paso school district. Aguirre won the elec-
tion, but his opponent, Gamza, later learned of possible voting irregulari-
ties that, if corrected, would result in the latter's victory. Gamza
challenged the election in both state and federal courts. The state suit was
dismissed for failure to give statutory notice within the prescribed time
period.20' The federal case proceeded on the theory that the voting irregu-
larities were of constitutional dimension. The trial court granted judgment
for the plaintiff and ordered that Gamza be installed as a member of the
school board.202 The trial court's decision was based upon a finding that
the voting irregularities were the product of "scienter, bad faith and
flagrant disregard for an existing court order." 20 3 The Fifth Circuit noted
that the Constitution protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, and
that qualified voters have a right to have their votes counted. 2°4 In this
case, however, the appellate court drew a distinction between state laws
and patterns of state action that systematically deny equality in voting and
"episodic events that, despite non-discriminatory laws, may result in the
dilution of an individual's vote. '205 The court concluded that a plaintiff
must show an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination in order
to challenge the unlawful administration by state officers of a nondiscrimi-
natory state law.20 6 Believing that the conduct found by the trial court to
support its judgment was insufficient to sustain a finding of constitutional
violation, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dis-
miss the complaint. 20 7
Two other cases decided during the survey period are of interest. In
196. 489 F. Supp. at 474.
197. Id. at 474-75.
198. Id. at 475.
199. Id.
200. 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1980).
201. Id. at 451.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 452.
205. Id. at 453.
206. Id. at 454.
207. Id. The court reminded the plaintiff that he had a remedy for the improprieties at
issue under the Texas Election Code, and that he had forfeited that remedy by not giving his




Garza v. Gates208 a three-judge federal panel ruled that the United States
Attorney General had failed to file an objection to a 1973 redistricting plan
submitted by Atascosa County within the sixty-day period required by the
Voting Rights Act.2°9 The court, thus, denied a motion for a preliminary
injunction to prevent the 1980 election of county commissioners. 210 In
Rodgers v. Commissioners Court21' the court accepted a reapportionment
plan submitted by the defendants and denied the plaintiffs request for a
special election.212
The Texas Election Code and Other State Statutes. On August 1, 1978, a
federal grand jury indicted Hidalgo County Criminal District Attorney
Oscar Mclnnis for perjury and conspiracy to commit murder. Mclnnis,
however, was reelected and returned to office for a term beginning January
1, 1979. The State of Texas, acting through the Texas Prosecutors Coordi-
nating Council brought suit under article 332d 213 to remove Mclnnis from
office. The case was dismissed with prejudice upon the authority of article
5986,214 which precludes the removal of a criminal district attorney for acts
of misconduct that occur prior to reelection. The court of civil appeals
reversed,2t 5 holding what while article 5986 was applicable, the statute
prohibited removal from office for acts of misconduct for which the voters
had forgiven the officeholder.216 The record was unclear as to whether the
voters knew of Mclnnis's acts of misconduct when they reelected him to
office and, thus, whether they had forgiven him. Upon application for a
writ of error, the Texas Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion wrote that
article 5986 precluded Mclnnis's removal from office.217 Upon motion for
rehearing, however, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its per curiam
opinion and reached a contrary result over four dissents. 2' 8 The court held
that article 332d, which provides for the reprimand, disqualification, or
removal of prosecuting attorneys, preempted the field with respect to the
regulation of prosecuting attorneys.219 Thus, the court ruled that the pas-
sage of article 322b in 1977 impliedly repealed article 5986.220 The dissent,
on the other hand, argued that although the removal provisions of article
322b define the nature of misconduct that constitutes grounds for removal,
they are silent on when the misconduct must occur.22' The dissent con-
tended that legislation with respect to timing was provided by article
208. 482 F. Supp. 1211 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (per curiam).
209. Id. at 1213; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
210. 482 F. Supp. at 1213.
211. 483 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
212. Id. at 782.
213. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 332d (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
214. Id. art. 5986 (Vernon 1962).
215. State v. Mclnnis, 586 S.W.2d 890, 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979).
216. Id. at 895.
217. See Mclnnis v. State, 603 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex. 1980).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 183.
221. Id. at 184.
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5986.222 The dissent could find no legislative history to support the con-
clusion that the legislature was repealing article 5986 when it enacted arti-
cle 332b. 223
Garcia v. Avia 224 concerned an election contest in Zavala County. The
trial court declared the election of five officers in the 1978 general elections
void and ordered a new election. 225 The court of civil appeals affirmed on
the basis that the trial court's order to impound election material was vio-
lated and, therefore, it was impossible to ascertain the true results of the
election.226 Article 9.15 of the Texas Election Code227 provides that when
it is impossible to ascertain the true results of the election, the court shall
adjudge such election void. The appellants also contended that the trial
court erred in allowing the inspection of impounded election materials.
They argued that before a trial court in an election contest can properly
order the ballot boxes to be opened, there must be a showing of fraud or
illegality. The appellate court overruled this contention, noting that as a
result of the amendment to article 8.15 in 1977,228 "[ilt follows that the
sacredness of the secret ballot is no longer threatened by an inspection of
-printed ballots. Consequently, a concern for the secrecy of the ballots is
no longer a valid consideration in determining whether ballot boxes
should be opened in a contest of a general election." 229 In so ruling, the
court distinguished earlier cases on the basis that they were decided prior
to the 1977 amendment.230
In Pierce v. Peters2 31 the San Antonio court of civil appeals granted a
writ of mandamus and required the removal of the name of a state legisla-
tive candidate from the ballot. The candidate had filed as a candidate for
the Democratic nomination for the office of state representative by at-
tempting to comply with article 13.08(d) of the Texas Election Code.232
That section allows a candidate, in lieu of the payment of a $400 filing fee,
to file a petition signed by eligible voters equal in number to at least two
percent of the number of votes cast within that district for the Democrtic
Party's candidate for governor in the 1978 gubernatorial general elec-
tion.2 33 It was contended that the petition was insufficient because it did
not reflect the city in which the parties signing the petition resided.234 The
222. Id. at 185.
223. Id. at 184.
224. 597 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ dism'd).
225. Id. at 403.
226. Id. at 406.
227. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9.15 (Vernon 1967).
228. Id. art. 8.15 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
229. 597 S.W.2d at 405 n.2.
230. See Markowsky v. Newman, 138 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, no
writ); Texas Pub. Util. Corp. v. Holland, 123 S.W.2d 1028 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1938, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
231. 599 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
232. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.08(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
233. Id.
234. See also Shields v. Upham, 597 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ)
(per curiam) (nominating petition that did not show street address in particular city within
district and did not show county that issued registration did not comply with requirements
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court of appeals agreed, holding that "address" has more than one mean-
ing and that the term is not necessarily synonymous with "residence" or
"domicile. ' 235 Under article 13.08(d), however, the court believed that ad-
dress refers to the residence of the voter and not merely to the place, such
as a post office box, where he receives his mail.236 Accordingly, the court
held that address must include a street address if residing in a city, and the
person's rural route address if not residing in a city.237 It also required
that the city be listed. 238
The San Antonio court of civil appeals also granted a writ of mandamus
ordering the removal from the official ballot of the name of a candidate for
trustee of the San Antonio Independent School District. 239 Under article
13.12(e) of the Texas Election Code, an application for a place on the bal-
lot shall be considered filed if it is sent to the proper chairman at his post
office address by registered or certified mail "not later than the day on
which the filing deadline falls."' 24° In Hernandez the candidate had mailed
his application prior to the filing deadline; it was not sent by certified or
registered mail, however, and was received after the date for filing. The
court ruled that, assuming the Election Code applied to this type of elec-
tion, the candidate had not complied with article 13.12.241 The court did
express doubt, however, that the Election Code even applied, stating that
the manner of applying for a place on the ballot is governed by section
23.03 of the Texas Education Code.2 42 The court implied that if the Edu-
cation Code rather than the Election Code applied, the general rule that an
"instrument is not 'filed' until it is received by the person with whom it is
required to be filed" would be applicable.2 43
In Yapor v. McConnell244 the El Paso court of civil appeals concluded
that a loyalty affidavit required pursuant to articles 13.12(b)245 and 6.02246
of the Election Code was not void even though the applicant had failed to
fill in his name, failed to supply the county of his residence, and failed to
state the office he was seeking.247 His loyalty oath, however, was signed at
the bottom of the form and properly notarized and acknowledged. The
court ruled that the failure to provide the information in the affidavit was
not fatal and it granted a writ of mandamus requiring that the candidate's
of TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.08(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); application for writ of
mandamus therefore was denied).
235. 599 S.W.2d at 850.
236. Id. at 850-51.
237. Id. at 851.
238. Id.
239. Hernandez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 598 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
240. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.12(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
241. Hernandez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 598 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 335.
244. 597 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ) (per curiam).
245. TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.12(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
246. Id. art. 6.02 (Vernon 1967).
247. 597 S.W.2d at 555-56.
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name be placed on the ballot.248
In Taxpayers' Political Action Committee v. City of Houston249 the peti-
tioner sought to compel the Houston city council to call an election on a
tax limitation amendment to the city charter. Upon presentation of the
amendment, the council, in compliance with article 1170,250 called an elec-
tion for the purpose of submitting certain proposed amendments to the city
charter, including the tax amendment. Before the election could be held,
however, a suit was filed in federal court seeking to enjoin the election as
violative of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 25 ' Houston was able to
comply with the Voting Rights Act with respect to one proposed amend-
ment dealing with the method of electing councilmembers. That proposi-
tion was put to the voters, and the election was certified by the secretary of
state. Article 1165252 and the Texas Constitution 253 prohibit amendments
to a city charter more often than once every two years. As a result, the
court of civil appeals found that the Houston city council had no clear
legal duty to call an election on petitioner's proposed amendment.25 4
III. ZONING
Sexually Related Businesses. In Stansberry v. Holmes2"5 the United States
District Court had permanently enjoined the enforcement of certain
county regulations dealing with zoning of certain sexually-oriented com-
mercial enterprises. 256 The Fifth Circuit reversed the case and remanded,
holding that the regulations were not invalid as violative of constitutional
rights of free speech and that the regulations were not unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. 257 The appellate court noted that the case did not
involve a first amendment question because the zoning regulations did not
attempt to zone businesses such as bookstores or movie theatres that are
protected by the first amendment's free speech and press clauses. 258
Rather, the court agreed with the appellants that the regulations must be
measured by traditional zoning standards: whether the regulations are ar-
bitrary and unreasonable, having no rational relationship to legitimate
governmental interests.259 The court concluded that the instant regula-
tions clearly met this standard and that the definitions contained in the
regulations were sufficiently clear to provide adequate warnings of pro-
scribed conduct. 260
248. Id. at 556.
249. 596 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ).
250. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1170 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
252. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1165 (Vernon 1963).
253. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
254. 596 S.W.2d at 150.
255. 613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1980).
256. Id. at 1287.
257. Id. at 1290.
258. Id. at 1288.
259. Id. at 1289.
260. Id. at 1289-90.
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Harris County's comprehensive regulations concerning massage parlors
were attacked in Harper v. Lindsay.261 The trial court had found that the
regulations' prohibition of massage by the opposite sex262 exceeded the
scope of authority the legislature had delegated to the county commission-
ers' court.263 In all other respects the trial court upheld the validity of the
regulations. On appeal, the trial court's invalidation of the transsexual
massage provisions was not at issue. Rather the one unconstitutional pro-
vision found by the Fifth Circuit was a requirement that a six-inch by six-
inch unobstructed opening on all interior doors of a massage parlor had no
rational basis. 2 "4
Harris County was in court again when its authorities began investigat-
ing a modeling studio to determine whether the business was operated for
the purpose of prostitution. The trial court granted a temporary injunc-
tion ordering Glenn Green and others to abate the nuisance by permitting
and allowing no person or persons to use the premises for the purposes of
prostitution. 265 The court found that Green was one of the parties in law-
ful possession of the modeling studio. Two months later, an undercover
police officer went to the studio and he was solicited for an act of prostitu-
tion. The state then filed a motion for contempt against Green, alleging
that he intentionally and knowingly violated the order of the court by al-
lowing an act of prostitution within the studio. The trial court held Green
in contempt. 266 An application for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the
Texas Supreme Court.267 Green contended that there was no evidence to
support the ruling that he personally disobeyed the temporary injunction.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the contempt judgment was void and
granted the writ.268
Spot Zoning. Spot zoning occurs when a particular tract of land is zoned
differently from the surrounding area without regard to a plan or design or
without justification by changed conditions. In such a case the zoning or-
dinance is void.269 A zoning ordinance was said to be impermissible as
spot zoning in Bernard v. City of Bedford.270 Bedford had obtained a land
use plan and used it as a guide in enacting a city ordinance in 1968. In
261. 616 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1980).
262. See id. at 860.
263. Harper v. Lindsay, 454 F. Supp. 597, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
264. 616 F.2d at 855. In an opinion by Judge Fay, the appellate court wrote:
The case presents a touchy situation, and our decision is likely to rub some of
the parties the wrong way. We shall attempt, however, to apply the soothing
balm of reason to the knotty issues before us in an effort to ease the tensions
that have arisen.
We hold that all but one provision of Harris County's challenged massage
parlor regulations are constitutional.
Id. at 851 (footnote omitted).
265. See Exparte Green, 603 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex. 1980).
266. See id.
267. Exparte Green, 603 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1980).
268. Id. at 217-18.
269. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ArNN. art. 101 1c (Vernon 1963).
270. 593 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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1970 an additional ordinance was passed rezoning certain property. Adja-
cent property owners brought suit to have the ordinance declared void.
The trial court denied relief and the court of appeals affirmed. 27' The
court agreed that if the ordinance constituted spot zoning it would be void;
the judges however, went on to say that the courts have no authority to
interfere with zoning decisions unless the ordinance represents a clear
abuse of municipal discretion.272 The court stated that the burden was on
the party challenging the validity of the ordinance to show that no facts
existed that would authorize the city to exercise its discretion by enacting
the ordinance. 273 The court of civil appeals thus characterized the appel-
lants' burden as showing that the ordinance deviated from the city's com-
prehensive plan and that such deviation was without justification. 274 The
court found that the appellants had not met that burden.275
Spot zoning was also at issue in Tppett v. City of Pharr.276 The Corpus
Christi court of civil appeals found that the rezoning of certain property
created an island within a greater area that already was zoned for single
family residential dwellings and, thus, was spot zoning.277 The court ob-
served that the ordinance was not necessitated by changed conditions bear-
ing any substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the city. 278 Accordingly, the trial court's decision to deny relief
to the plaintiff was reversed. 279
IV. ANNEXATION
Navigation Territory. Two cases reported during the survey period in-
volved the annexation of navigation territory pursuant to articles 1183
through 1187.280 In City of Nassau Bay v. City of Webster 281 the court of
civil appeals held that a home rule city may not use articles 1183 through
1187, the navigable streams annexation statutes, to annex territory within
another city's extraterritorial jurisdiction without the consent of the latter
city.282 In 1977 Nassau Bay passed an ordinance purporting to annex cer-
271. Id. at 810.
272. Id. at 811.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 811-12.
276. 600 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ granted).
277. Id. at 956.
278. Id. at 957.
279. Id. at 959. The court noted that an ordinance that singles out a small area for
treatment different from that accorded to similar surrounding land, without any showing of
justifiable changes in conditions, especially when such preferential treatment is given in an
amendatory zoning ordinance that is contrary to a long-established comprehensive zoning
plan, is condemned as spot zoning. Id. at 955.
280. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1183-1187 (Vernon 1963). These statutes allow
Texas cities located on navigable streams to extend their boundaries for certain limited pur-
poses by 2,500 feet on both sides of such streams for 20 miles.
281. 600 S.W.2d 9051(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), writ reor n.r.e per curiam,
608 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1980).
282. Id. at 909. The court also ruled that it was not necessary for the suit to have been
brought by a quo warranto proceeding or that the state be a party, for the reason that Web-
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tain property along a navigable bayou, property concededly within the ex-
traterritorial jurisdictions of the city of Webster and the city of Houston.
Webster sued and Houston intervened to have the ordinance declared
void, to oust Nassau Bay from any claim over the disputed area, and to
enjoin Nassau Bay from attempting to exercise authority over the area.
The Municipal Annexation Act283 requires an annexing city to obtain
the consent of an affected city when attempting to annex territory within
the affected city's extraterritorial jurisdiction.284 Nassau Bay argued that
the consent requirement was inapplicable when a city annexes territory
pursuant to the navigable streams statutes, and cited a "savings clause" in
the Act to support this exception. 285 The court rejected this argument and
observed that Nassau Bay's interpretation would make it possible for two
cities to exercise simultaneous and possibly inconsistent authority over the
same area, with one city acting pursuant to its powers over its navigation
territory and the other city acting pursuant to its rights with regard to its
extraterritorial area.286 The court read the Municipal Annexation Act and
navigable streams annexation statutes to avoid this conflict and concluded
that the savings clause in the Act was not meant to allow a city to annex
navigation territory already within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of an-
other city, but rather "was meant to exempt navigation areas already an-
nexed from encroachment by another city's extraterritorial jurisdiction
and to exempt otherwise valid navigation annexations from the various
restrictions imposed by Article 970a.' ' 287 The court, apparently reaching
the issue for the first time in Texas, also ruled that the annexation ordi-
nance was void because Nassau Bay as a home rule city could not use the
navigable streams annexation procedure in article 1183.288 The court held
that the clear language of article 1183 specifies that it applies to cities "act-
ing under special charters," 289 and that for purposes of article 1183 the
term "special charters" does not include home rule charters.290 The Texas
Supreme Court refused Nassau Bay's application for writ of error, finding
no reversible error, and reserved the question of whether articles 1183
through 1187 apply only to cities acting under special charters.291
In another navigation territory case, City of Port Arthur v. Jefferson
ster's and Houston's contentions, if proved, would demonstrate that the ordinance was void
ab initio and not merely voidable for irregularities. Id. at 907.
283. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp. 1963-1980).
284. Id. § 3C (Vernon 1963).
285. TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, historical note (Vernon 1963) states: "It is ex-
pressly provided that this Act shall not repeal or affect Article 1183 to Article 1187, both
inclusive, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, nor apply to any territories held by any city
or town under the provisions of said Articles or the laws of which said Articles were a
codification."
286. 600 S.W.2d at 909.
287. Id. (emphasis in original).
288. Id.
289. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1183 (Vernon 1963).
290. 600 S.W.2d at 910.
291. 608 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam).
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County Fresh Water Supply District No. 1,292 the Beaumont court of civil
appeals held that the 500-foot-width requirement of section 7B-1 of the
Municipal Annexation Act 293 is inapplicable when a city annexes territory
within its navigation territory or within the boundaries of a water dis-
trict.294 In 1978 Port Arthur annexed all of the territory within Jefferson
County Fresh Water Supply District No. I and thereafter abolished the
water district. The water district challenged this annexation, and in 1979
Port Arthur annexed and abolished the water district a second time. At the
time of each attempted annexation, the territory in the southern tip of the
water district was less than 500 feet in width at its narrowest point and was
within Port Arthur's navigation territory295 but outside its extraterritorial
jurisdiction. At the time of the first attempted annexation, the territory in
the northern tip of the water district was less than 500 feet wide and was
within the city's navigation territory and extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Rejecting the water district's contention that the annexation ordinances
were void because of the 500-foot-width requirement of section 7B-1, the
court noted that a savings clause in the Act 296 provided that the Act did
-not repeal or affect the navigable streams annexation statutes.297 The
court held that the addition of the 500-foot width requirement to the Act
in 1973 did not affect this exemption of navigation territory from the pro-
visions of the Act and therefore did not impose a 500-foot minimum width
requirement for the annexation of navigation territory. 298 The court also
held that the 500-foot requirement did not apply to the annexation of a
water district, 299 and that the annexations were therefore proper because
all the area that was annexed was within the water district.3°°
"Buffer Strip" Annexations. In City of West Orange v. State ex rel City of
Orange301 West Orange sued Orange, seeking a judicial apportionment of
the two cities' extraterritorial jurisdictions and claiming that West Orange
had established its extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain disputed terri-
tory via a 1970 ordinance. The trial court held that the disputed territory
was within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Orange by virtue of a 1960
292. 596 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
293. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 7B-I (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980), pro-
vides in part: "No home rule or general law city may annex any area, whether publicly or
privately owned, unless the width of such area at its narrowest point is at least 500 feet
294. 596 S.W.2d at 556-557. The court also held that the water district was bound by a
portion of the judgment from which it did not appeal and that it must proceed in federal
court if it wished to challenge the annexation for noncompliance with the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 596 S.W.2d at 557-58.
295. In 1913 Port Arthur had established a navigation territory pursuant to the forerun-
ner of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1183-1187 (Vernon 1963). 596 S.W.2d at 554.
296. See note 285 supra.
297. 596 S.W.2d at 556.
298. Id. at 555-56.
299. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 11 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980) governs
the annexation of water districts.
300. 596 S.W.2d at 557.
301. 598 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980).
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Orange "buffer strip" annexation ordinance. 302 On appeal West Orange
contended that the 1960 ordinance was void because (1) the first boundary
call could not be located on the ground and (2) the narrow, long strip of
territory annexed could not support a legal annexation under the Texas
Supreme Court's holding in City of Pasadena v. State ex rel City of Hous-
ton .303 The court of civil appeals held that, although there was an error in
the first call of the land description in Orange's 1960 ordinance, the
description was sufficiently certain to ascertain the territory Orange in-
tended to annex and was therefore a legally sufficient description. 3°4 The
court also held that the 1960 ordinance, though probably originally invalid
as a "strip ordinance" under the holding of City of Pasadena, had been
validated by a 1969 validating act of the legislature. 305 The Texas
Supreme Court, however, reversed the judgments of the trial court and the
court of civil appeals, holding that the Orange "buffer strip" ordinance was
invalid because the strip was not "adjacent" to Orange when the ordinance
was passed or at any other time. 3°6 The supreme court further held that
the 1969 validating act did not resurrect the ordinance because the vali-
dating act did not specifically state that it validated annexations that lack-
ed the requisite adjacency, and because the ordinance attempted to annex
territory within West Orange's extraterritorial jurisdiction.30 7 Absent
some specific validating statute, therefore, buffer strip ordinances, deficient
under City of Pasadena, may be beyond redemption.
Procedure. Article 1175, section 2 gives home rule cities power to annex
"according to such rules as may be provided by. . .charter not inconsis-
tent with the procedural rules prescribed by the Municipal Annexation
Act."' 30 8 In Knapp v. City of El Paso30 9 the El Paso court of civil appeals
was faced with the problem of reconciling an El Paso City Charter provi-
sion with the procedural requirements of the Act. Knapp, a landowner in
territory that was annexed by El Paso in 1978, brought suit to enjoin the
annexation. The trial court denied his request for an injunction.310
On appeal Knapp asserted that the annexation ordinance was void be-
cause El Paso had not "instituted" annexation proceedings between ten to
twenty days after the public hearing on the annexation, as required by
section 6 of the Act. 311 The public hearing was held on August 22, 1978.
On September 5, 1978, the annexation ordinance was introduced at a city
council meeting, and the city clerk was directed to publish the ordinance in
302. Id. at 389.
303. 442 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1969).
304. 598 S.W.2d at 390-91.
305. Id. at 391-92; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 974d-13 (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1963-1980).
306. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 194, 194-96 (Jan 21, 1981).
307. Id. at 196.
308. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 2 (Vernon 1963).
309. 586 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
310. Id. at 217.
311. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 6 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980).
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the city's official newspaper in accordance with the charter's requirement
that publication precede by more than thirty days any further action on the
ordinance. After publication and the running of the thirty-day period, the
ordinance was passed on first reading on October 10, 1978, and on second
reading on October 17, 1978. Knapp, relying on two Texas Supreme Court
cases 312 holding that passage of an annexation ordinance on first reading
constituted the institution of annexation proceedings, argued that El Paso
had not "instituted" proceedings within the required ten to twenty days
after the public hearing. The court of civil appeals held that passing an
ordinance on first reading is not the exclusive method for instituting an-
nexation proceedings, and that El Paso had complied with the Act, and
properly harmonized the Act and its charter requirements, by instituting
annexation proceedings via the September 5 introduction of the ordinance
and direction to the city clerk to make publication. 313
V. INCORPORATION
The Texas Supreme Court considered one incorporation case during the
survey period, State ex rel Needham v. Wilbanks.314 In 1973 the rural
community of Hallsburg attempted to incorporate. The incorporated area
included only three of the community's five residences, but consisted of
strips 200 to 500 feet in width running over thirty-one miles along county
and state roads.315 Within the corporate limits were seventy-eight resi-
dences, one school, three businesses, two churches, and no public build-
ings. The city did not provide any municipal services. Residences were
scattered, and there was no compact center or nucleus of population. The
area was rural in character and appearance, and was not capable of receiv-
ing municipal services on any reasonable basis. A quo warranto action
was brought by the State of Texas, acting through the district attorney of
McLennan County, seeking to have the incorporation declared invalid.
After a jury trial, the trial court rendered a judgment upholding the incor-
poration's validity, and the Waco court of civil appeals affirmed. 316
The supreme court reversed and rendered judgment for the state, hold-
ing "as a matter of law that Hallsburg was a rural community immedi-
ately prior to incorporation and did not constitute a city or town as those
terms are used in the constitutional provision authorizing incorpora-
tion."' 317 Noting that incorporation "contemplates the existence of an ac-
312. Fuller Springs v. State ex rel. City of Lufkin, 513 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1974); City of
Duncanville v. City of Woodland Hills, 489 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1972).
313. 586 S.W.2d at 218.
314. 595 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. 1980).
315. The community's church and school also were not included in the incorporated city
limits. Id. at 850.
316. 583 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979).
317. 595 S.W.2d at 853. The constitutional provision referred to is TEX. CONST. art. XI,
§ 4, which provides: "Cities and towns having a population of five thousand or less may be
chartered alone by general law." The enabling legislation, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
966 (Vernon 1963), provides: "Any city or town containing six hundred inhabitants or over
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tual village, town, or city," 3 18 the court concluded that Hallsburg did not
satisfy the criteria established by case law for what constitutes a village,
town, or city. The respondents nevertheless contended that the legislature
had validated Hallsburg's incorporation through the passage of article
974d-21, 319 which became effective in 1975. The supreme court held,
however, that article 974d-21 did not validate the incorporation because
Hallsburg did not constitute a city or town and because the validating act
applied by its express terms only to "cities and towns. ' '320
VI. CONDEMNATION
The Texas Supreme Court decided two condemnation cases during the
survey period, although neither case appears to consider issues of broad
significance. In Harris County Flood Control District v. Shell Pipe Line
Corp .321 the supreme court considered an inverse condemnation suit
brought by Shell to recover the cost of lowering its pipeline so that a flood
control drainage ditch could be enlarged. In 1929 Shell had obtained a
pipeline easement in a Harris County roadway for the fee owner of the
property, subject only to the prior dedication of the roadway for road and
street purposes. Shell maintained pipelines in the roadway until 1975
when it was required to lower the pipeline by the Harris County Flood
Control District. In a nonjury case the trial court required the district to
pay Shell the costs of lowering the pipeline; the court of civil appeals af-
firmed.322 The supreme court affirmed the lower courts, finding: (1) that
there was evidence to support the trial court's finding that the work per-
formed on the drainage ditch was not a use of the roadway for "road and
street" purposes; 323 (2) that "enlarging a drainage ditch to accommodate a
drainage district is not a public purpose for which the road was dedi-
cated"; 324 (3) that Shell, having obtained its easements from the fee owner
eight years before the district was created, had a right to maintain its pipe-
lines within the easement, which was dominant to the right of the district
to cross the roadway;325 and (4) that Shell was entitled to compensation for
the taking or damaging of its easement.326
may be incorporated as such, with all the powers, rights, immunities and privileges men-
tioned and described in the provisions of this title relating to cities and towns .
318. 595 S.W.2d at 851.
319. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 974d-21 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980).
320. 595 S.W.2d at 854.
321. 591 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1979).
322. 578 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979).
323. 591 S.W.2d at 799.
324. Id. The court noted that the uses to which a road may be dedicated generally in-
clude "travel, transportation of persons and property and communication." Id. (citing Hill
Farm v. Hill County, 436 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1969)). The court held that an outfall ditch
carrying storm water runoff and constructed pursuant to the enlargement of the drainage
ditch was not a mode of transportation. 591 S.W.2d at 799.
325. 591 S.W.2d at 799-800. The court indicated that the result might have been differ-
ent if Shell had occupied the status of a tenant, licensee, or franchisee rather than an ease-
ment owner. Id. at 800.
326. Id. at 800.
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In Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. Celanese Corp.327 the supreme
court declared that a condemnor seeking to condemn an unlimited ease-
ment need only specify in general terms in the pleadings those property
rights the condemnor is attempting to appropriate. The Coastal Industrial
Water Authority, pursuant to the general eminent domain statutes, 328
brought a condemnation proceeding to condemn a water line easement on
land owned by Celanese. In its condemnor's statement the authority
sought to condemn a "permanent water line easement in, on, upon, along,
under, over and across" a tract of land located by metes and bounds.329
Special commissioners appointed to assess damages awarded Celanese
$29,000. The authority deposited this award in the registry of the county
court and constructed an underground water pipeline. Celanese objected
to the award and requested a trial in county court; because Celanese with-
drew the $29,000 from the registry, however, the trial court held that it was
thereby prevented from litigating the authority's right to take the property,
though it could litigate the issue of compensation.330 Celanese filed special
exceptions to the authority's condemnor's statement, which the trial court
sustained.33' The authority refused to amend the statement, and the trial
court dismissed the suit.332 The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding
that the statement failed to allege the specific rights and uses taken by the
authority.333 The supreme court reversed and remanded the cause to the
trial court, holding that the special exceptions had been incorrectly sus-
tained. 334 The court noted that the authority sought an unlimited water line
easement and rejected Celanese's argument that the statement failed to
give adequate notice of the damages attributable to the taking, impaired
the trial court's ability to judge properly the admissibility of evidence, and
adversely affected the court's ability to charge the jury. 335 The court rea-
soned that an unlimited easement carries with it all rights reasonably nec-
essary for enjoyment consistent with the intended use, and that the facts
surrounding the particular easement sought would guide the trial court in
charging the jury and determining what evidence was admissible. 336
Several decisions from the courts of civil appeals considered condemna-
tion issues. In an inverse condemnation case, State Department of High-
327. 592 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1979).
328. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 3264-3271 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980-1981).
329. 592 S.W.2d at 599.
330. Id. (citing State v. Jackson, 388 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1965)).
331. 592 S.W.2d at 599. On appeal to the county court, the condemnor's statement be-
comes the equivalent of an original petition and is subject to challenge by special exceptions.
Id. (citing Curfman v. State, 240 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
332. 592 S.W.2d at 599.
333. 578 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979). TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 3264 (Vernon 1968) provides that the statement "shall describe the land
sought to be condemned, state the purpose for which it is intended to be used, the name of
the owner, if known, and that the plaintiff and the owner have been unable to agree upon
the value of the land or the damages."
334. 592 S.W.2d at 602.
335. Id. at 600-03.
336. Id. at 601-03.
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ways & Public Transportation v. Elkins Lake Municipal Utility District,337 a
municipal utility district sought and received from the trial court the unu-
sual relief of an injunction requiring the Department of Highways to file
condemnation proceedings relating to land owned by the district. The De-
partment of Highways had done road and bridge construction work near
the district's property with the result, the district contended, that large
amounts of dirt, sand, and silt were washed onto the district's property.
The district filed suit, alleging a taking without compensation, and sought
money damages and a temporary injunction enjoining construction. At a
hearing on the temporary injunction, the district obtained an order requir-
ing the department to file a condemnation action to condemn part of the
district's property for the purpose of a flow easement, 338 purportedly pur-
suant to authority granted by article 3269. 339 On appeal from this order,
the court of civil appeals held that article 3269 did not authorize an order
to file a condemnation suit, but rather was designed to allow the con-
demnor to seek alternative and inconsistent remedies in the same action.
340
The court also found several other reasons for reversing the trial court,
including the impropriety of issuing an injunction when an adequate rem-
edy at law, an inverse condemnation action, was available.
34
'
In a case involving the relative rights of a landowner and a city in a
street dedicated to the public, the Amarillo court of civil appeals held in
Pittman v. City of Amarillo342 that, where a street had been dedicated to
the city of Amarillo without restriction, the use of a private sewer line
crossing the dedicated road was secondary and inferior to the public use
and control of the street. Thus, the court found that there was no taking
for which the city was required to pay compensation when the paving of
the street required the destruction of the private sewer line.
343
The right of a county to condemn a fee simple for road and drainage
purposes was at issue in Gordon v. Harris County.344 The landowners had
filed objections to an award of $28,000 made by special commissioners
pursuant to Harris County's condemnation of certain land for road and
drainage purposes. The county placed the $28,000 in the registry of the
court and entered upon the land to begin construction. The trial court de-
nied the temporary injunction sought by the landowners to halt construc-
tion. On appeal, the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered the
temporary injunction prayed for.345 The court held that article 6789a 346
337. 593 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
338. Id. at 402.
339. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3269 (Vernon 1968).
340. 593 S.W.2d at 402.
341. Id. at 403.
342. 598 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ reftd n.r.e.).
343. Id. at 944.
344. 603 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980). [Editor's Note: After
this Article went to print, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case. 24 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 328 (Apr. 8, 1981). This decision will be discussed in next year's Survey.]
345. 603 S.W.2d at 295.
346. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6789a (Vernon 1960).
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and articles 3264 through 3271347 did not authorize the county to condemn
a fee simple estate for drainage purposes, and that, as a result, the condem-
nation proceedings were void and the denial of the temporary injunction
was an abuse of discretion.348
A suit attempting to set aside a condemnation judgment that had been
entered approximately eight years earlier was unsuccessful for a number
of reasons. In Hogan v. City of Tyler34 9 the landowners claimed that a
condemnation judgment was void because the city of Tyler had improp-
erly attempted to acquire, and the condemnation judgment did in fact
grant, a fee simple title to the condemned land in contravention of article
3270.350 The trial court disagreed and rendered judgment for the city. 351
The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that a challenge could not be
made to the lawfulness of the taking because the original landowner had
accepted the award of the special commissioners by withdrawing the
award deposited in the registry of court.352 Alternatively, the court found
that the statement initiating the condemnation did not request a fee simple
title and that the condemnation judgment did not grant such an estate.353
Finally, the court ruled that the suit was barred by article 5529, 3 54 a four-
year statute of limitation.355
VII. EMPLOYEES
A number of decisions during the survey period involved the relation-
ship between a local government and its employees. Cases resolving
whether a local government may replace civil service positions with an
independent contractor system, whether the requirements of the Texas
Municipal Retirement System result in prohibited age discrimination, and
whether rules prohibiting "conduct prejudicial to good order" may consti-
tutionally support disciplinary action were decided, as well as cases related
to the Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act.
Abolition of Civil Service Positions. A Texas local government must act in
good faith when abolishing a civil service position.356 In Moncrief v.
347. Id. arts. 3264-3271 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980-1981).
348. 603 S.W.2d at 295.
349. 602 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
350. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3270 (Vernon 1968) (prohibits the acquisition of a
fee simple estate except when expressly allowed by law).
351. 602 S.W.2d at 555.
352. Id. at 557. The court cites the holding and rationale of State v. Jackson, 388 S.W.2d
924 (Tex. 1965). 602 S.W.2d at 557.
353. 602 S.W.2d at 558.
354. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
355. 602 S.W.2d at 559-60.
356. See City of San Antonio v. Wallace, 161 Tex. 41, 338 S.W.2d 153 (1960), in which
the supreme court ruled that courts may determine whether a local government abused its
discretion in abolishing civil service positions. In Wallace the court determined that San
Antonio had not acted in good faith in abolishing certain civil service positions when San
Antonio previously had attempted to destroy the positions by transferring employees to a
non-civil service department, when the services performed by the employees were still neces-
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Tate 357 the Texas Supreme Court refined the meaning of "good faith."
Tarrant County adopted an independent contractor system to provide the
county's custodial services and discharged janitorial workers who were
civil service employees. Some of these employees brought suit, requesting
a declaration that the county's actions were a nullity and that they should
be reinstated with back pay. The employees argued that the decision was
made in bad faith on the grounds that their employee merit system should
be free from political control, that the county had ample funds to continue
their employment, and that no termination was justified in the absence of a
"functional change" in their work.358 The court of civil appeals affirmed
the trial court's judgment granting the plaintiffs the requested relief.359
The court of civil appeals held that the trial court had not abused its dis-
cretion in finding that the county had acted in bad faith, despite evidence
that the county had based its actions on studies showing that the change to
the independent contractor system would save the county approximately
$220,000 over a two-year period. 360 The supreme court reversed and ren-
dered a judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing. 36' The court found it
irrelevant that the county was in good financial condition and could afford
to pay the discharged workers; rather, the court emphasized the economies
that the new system was supposed to achieve, and held that the record did
not support the finding that the county had acted in bad faith. 362 Thus
Moncrief stands for the proposition that a local government, even if it is
able to bear the higher cost of a service rendered by civil service employ-
ees, will normally be entitled to terminate those employees to achieve
economies and will not be considered to be acting in bad faith.
Age Discrimination in Retirement Plans. A/ford v. City of Lubbock 363 cre-
ates the possibility that cities participating in the Texas Municipal Retire-
ment System (TMRS) 364 will be required to make significant back
payments on behalf of employees hired after they reached fifty years of age
who were prohibited by the statute because of their age from being en-
rolled in TMRS. The plaintiffs in A/ford were employees of the city of
Lubbock who had been hired after they had reached fifty years of age and
who were retired when they reached sixty-five. During the entire period of
the plaintiffs' employment, the city did not deduct from the plaintiffs'
paychecks the five percent employee contribution required by TMRS, nor
did the city contribute the ten percent required of the city-employer, be-
sary services, and when there was no assertion that the purpose of the abolition was to effect
economies. Id. at 156-59.
357. 593 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1980).
358. Id. at 313-14. An example of a functional change is the replacement of elevator
operators with automatic elevators.
359. 586 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979).
360. Id. at 563.
361. 593 S.W.2d at 314.
362. Id. at 313-14.
363. 484 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
364. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6243h (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980-1981).
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cause TMRS did not allow participation by employees who began employ-
ment after age fifty.365 Plaintiffs claimed that this treatment constituted
age discrimination in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA),366 the state statutory policy against age discrimina-
tion,367 and the equal protection clauses of the United States and Texas
Constitutions.368 The court found that, although relief was not warranted
under Texas statutory law or under the ADEA, 369 the refusal to allow
plaintiffs to participate in TMRS had no rational basis,370 was clearly dis-
criminatory in that those hired after they reached fifty received fewer ben-
efits than those hired before they reached fifty,371 and was therefore a
violation of plaintiffs' rights under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.372 The court ordered the plaintiffs and the city to pay
to TMRS the amounts they would have paid had the plaintiffs been en-
rolled in TMRS and ordered benefits to be paid to the plaintiffs in accord-
ance with the total of these amounts.373 The court limited its holding to
the facts of the case, but the decision calls into question any attempt to
deny TMRS benefits on the basis of age.
Constitutonality of Disciplinary Rules. In Davis v. Williams374 the Fifth
Circuit considered the constitutionality of an Irving fire department rule
and a city ordinance, both of which prohibited "conduct prejudicial to
good order. '375 In connection with a dispute over the fire department's
provision of ambulance service, Davis, a fireman and the head of the Irv-
ing fire fighters' association, made negative comments about the Irving fire
chief that were reported in a newspaper. The fire chief suspended Davis
indefinitely, citing the two rules permitting suspension for "conduct preju-
dicial to good order," and a general regulation prohibiting "derogatory
statements" regarding the department's policies or officers. 376 Davis
brought suit in federal district court, alleging that the three regulations
relied upon were vague, overbroad, and facially unconstitutional under the
365. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 371, §§ 1-8, at 1146. The current statute, TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6243h, § III(2)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981), raises this age limit to 55.
366. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
367. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-14, § I (Vernon 1970) provides that no per-
son shall be denied the right to work, to earn a living, and to support himself and his family
solely because of his age.
368. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
369. 484 F. Supp. at 1005.
370. Id. at 1007. The court rejected Lubbock's contentions that a rational basis for the
plaintiffs' treatment existed. Lubbock had argued that: (1) a pension would not be mean-
mgful to an employee unless contributions had built up over a significant period of time; (2)
the 15-year service requirement constituted a reward to an employee for long service; (3) the
inclusion of those over 50 in TMRS would reduce benefits to all city employees; (4) the
TMRS restrictions were of legislative determination; and (5) the inclusion of those over 50
would result in additional and prohibitive administrative expenses. Id. at 1006-07.
371. Id. at 1007.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1007-08.
374. 617 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
375. Id. at 1101.
376. Id.; see note 378 infra.
[Vol. 35
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
first and fourteenth amendments. The district court agreed, enjoined the
enforcement of the regulations, and ordered Davis reinstated. 377 On ap-
peal Irving did not attack the district court's ruling that the "derogatory
statements" regulation was invalid. 378 Instead, the city only questioned
the holding that the fire department rule and the city ordinance prohibiting
"conduct prejudicial to good order" were facially unconstitutional. The
circuit court reversed the district court and found the rule and ordinance
facially valid. 379 The court noted that the catchall "conduct prejudicial to
good order" prohibition lost some of its offending nature with the deletion
of the "derogatory statements" regulation.380 Further, the court construed
the catchall phrase to apply only to undesirable conduct of the same gen-
eral kind as that forbidden by other more specific Irving rules. 38 1 As so
limited, the court concluded that the catchall provision gave the only no-
tice that can practically be given of an employer's intention to impose pun-
ishments on grounds not set out with particularity.382 The court noted
cases out of the United States Supreme Court sustaining punishments
under similarly broad provisions38 3 and considered itself bound by these
decisions not to hold the Irving rule and ordinance invalid, always and
however applied. 38 4 A strong dissent argued that, even as restricted, the
Irving catchall rule could cover communicative behavior shielded by the
first amendment and was vague in defining what type of conduct was pro-
hibited.385
Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act. The Firemen's and Police-
men's Civil Service Act 386 and related statutes spawned a number of deci-
sions during the survey period. In City of Houston v. Cook 387 the court of
civil appeals reversed the trial court's judgment that the plaintiff, a former
assistant fire chief for the city of Houston, receive over $28,000 in overtime
pay, and rendered judgment that the plaintiff take nothing. The court held
377. 617 F.2d at 1102.
378. The enjoined and unappealed regulation provided that members of the fire depart-
ment:
Refrain from being a party to any malicious gossip, report, or activity that
would tend to disrupt department morale or bring discredit to the department
or any member thereof; or making derogatory statements or adversely criticiz-
in department policy, activities, or officers, except by written report to the
Chief of the Department, through channels.
Id. at 1101.
379. Id. at 1105.
380. Id. at 1103. The court stated that the "derogatory statements" regulation could not
be enforced as a specific prohibition, nor could it be enforced as subsumed within the "con-
duct prejudicial to good order" provision. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding a "disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order" dismissal standard); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)
(upholding a "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" dismissal standard).
384. 617 F.2d at 1105.
385. Id. at 1105-08 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
386. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981).
387. 596 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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that article 1269p, section 6,388 which provides that certain personnel in
fire departments in cities having more than 10,000 inhabitants are not to
work more than the normal hours worked by other city employees gener-
ally, does not apply to employees in supervisory or management positions
like the position held by the plaintiff.389 The court said that it was "unrea-
sonable to believe that the Legislature intended to limit to forty hours the
time management personnel may expend in the operation of a fire depart-
ment.'
390
In Fincher v. City of Texarkana391 the Texarkana court of civil appeals
held that the trial court had never acquired jurisdiction over an appeal
from a Texarkana Civil Service Commission order sustaining the Texar-
kana police chiefs indefinite suspension of the appellant policeman,
Fincher.392 The court stated that the commission's order was not a final,
appealable order under section 16 of the Act, 3 9 3 because the commission
had not ordered a dismissal, a reinstatement, or a definite time of suspen-
sion.394 The court ordered the cause of action dismissed in the district
court, which left the proceeding pending before the civil service commis-
sion for entry of a final order.395
In City of Austin v. Villegas396 the Beaumont court of civil appeals
reversed the trial court and rendered judgment for the city of Austin, up-
holding the indefinite suspension of a city police officer for insubordina-
tion. 397 The court ruled that the Austin police chief had sufficiently
complied with the Texas Supreme Court's suggestion in City of San
Antonio v. Poulos398 that an order disciplining an officer consider sepa-
rately each rule allegedly violated and state the precise factual basis for
each violation.399 The court of civil appeals found that the charge in ques-
tion sufficiently alleged that the officer had willfully disobeyed a lawful
order and set out factual allegations supporting the charge.4°°
In Crawford v. City of Houston40 1 the court affirmed the trial court,
388. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269p, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
389. 596 S.W.2d at 299.
390. Id.
391. 598 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
392. Id. at 23-24.
393. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16 (Vernon 1963) provides in part: "The
Commission shall hold a hearing and render a decision in writing within thirty (30) days
after it receives said notice of appeal. Said decision shall state whether or not the suspended
officer or employee shall be permanently or temporarily dismissed. . . or be restored to his
former position ...."
394. 598 S.W.2d at 23-24.
395. Id. at 24.
396. 603 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
397. Id. at 285.
398. 422 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1967).
399. 603 S.W.2d at 284; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16 (Vernon 1963),
which provides in part that the written reasons for a suspension "shall not only point out the
civil service rule alleged to have been violated by the suspended employee, but shall contain
the alleged acts of the employee which the department head contends are in violation of the
civil service rules."
400. 603 S.W.2d at 284.
401. 600 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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which had dismissed for want of jurisdiction an attempted appeal from an
order of the Houston Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Commis-
sion sustaining two consecutive disciplinary suspensions of fifteen days
each .402 The affected police officer argued that the 1977 amendment to
article 1269m, section 18 of the Act 403 allowed appeals of disciplinary sus-
pensions of fifteen days or less. The court found Firemen's & Policemen's
Civil Service Commission v. Blanchard4°4 controlling and rejected the of-
ficer's argument.40 5 The court further ruled that the suspensions should
not be considered as indefinite suspensions because they were to run con-
secutively.40 6 Finally, the court ruled that the trial court did not have ju-
risdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 40 7 to consider
the officer's complaints; the court held that the suspensions gave rise to no
cause of action independent of the Civil Service Act and that the officer
could not circumvent that Act, which denied an appeal to the courts under
the facts, by filing an action for a declaratory judgment.4°8 Another cov-
ered employee given a disciplinary suspension was denied access to the
courts in Duckett v. Civil Service Commission 4°9 on similar grounds. 410
A promotional decision was questioned by a passed over applicant in
Matheson v. Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Service Commission .41 Mathe-
son, a Denton city policeman who had made the highest grade on an ex-
amination for the vacant position of assistant chief, appealed to the
Denton Civil Service Commission when the Denton chief of police ap-
pointed another candidate. Matheson argued that the chief of police gave
no valid reason for not picking Matheson in his report to the commission,
as required by article 1269m, section 14E of the Act. 412 The commission
heard evidence reflecting the lesser fitness of Matheson and sustained the
402. Id. at 892.
403. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 18 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
404. 582 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1979) (Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act does not
authorize appeals of disciplinary suspensions of 15 days or less unless the order violates a
constitutional right or adversely affects a vested property right).
405. 600 S.W.2d at 893.
406. Id. at 893-94. The suspensions were based on unrelated incidents and were issued
in separate orders. Id. at 892.
407. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965).
408. 600 S.W.2d at 894-95.
409. 598 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
410. Id. at 642. The court also found that TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 20
(Vernon 1963), which provides for disciplinary suspensions, is not unconstitutionally void
for vagueness. 598 S.W.2d at 641 (citing Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Attic Club, Inc., 457
S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1970)).
411. 587 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
412. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 14E (Vernon 1963) provides in part:
[T]he Head of such Department shall appoint the person having the highest
grade, except where such Head of the Department shall have a valid reason
for not appointing such highest name, and in such cases he shall, before such
appointment, file his reasons in writing, for rejection of the higher name or
names, with the Commission, which reasons shall be valid and subject to re-
view by the Commission upon the application of such rejected person.
The Denton Police Chief's report merely stated that the man appointed was the best quali-
fied applicant and that his advancement would be in the best interests of the continuing
efficiency of the department. 587 S.W.2d at 796.
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decision of the chief of police. A judgment of the trial court in favor of the
commission was sustained by the Fort Worth court of civil appeals, which
found (1) that the chief of police's report to the commission was adequate,
though it never commented negatively on Matheson, and (2) that, in any
case, there was substantial evidence received by the commission support-
ing the decision not to promote Matheson.41 3
In City of Piano v. Acker 414 employees of the Plano police and fire de-
partments challenged ordinances providing pay increases over the basic
pay rates established for each job classification (e.g., patrolman, sergeant,
lieutenant) based upon the employee's rank and length of service. The
employees asserted that the manner in which these increases were made
available41 5 conflicted with article 1269m, section 8 of the Act, which re-
quires that all firemen and policemen within the same classification "be
paid the same salary." 416 The Dallas court of civil appeals reversed the
trial court and rendered summary judgment for Plano, holding that the
"classifications" referred to in section 8 are the ranks provided by the ordi-
nances of the city and that the provisions for pay increments represent
"longevity" or "seniority" pay not regulated by the statute.4 17
Finally, in three cases decided the same day and presenting the same
legal issue, one of the Houston courts of civil appeals held that the City of
Houston airport police,418 city marshalls,419 and park police420 were not
"policemen" within the meaning of section 2 of the Act, 42 1 and were there-
fore not entitled to the benefits of the Act.
VIII. POLICE POWER
In Berg Development Co. v. City of Missouri City,4 22 a case of first im-
pression in Texas, the court explored the limits of a city's power to regulate
the development of a residential subdivision. Berg Development Com-
413. 587 S.W.2d at 797.
414. 601 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
415. The ordinances in question provided that advancements within the salary structure
would be allowed only at six-month intervals based upon the city's fiscal year; to advance
from one six-month plateau to another, an employee had to complete a required number of
service months prior to an advancement date. The employees complained that the result of
these rules was that an employee hired one day before a fiscal year ended could advance a
service plateau in the middle of the next fiscal year, while an employee hired one day after
the fiscal year ended would not advance a plateau and therefore would be paid less. Id. at
69-70.
416. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
417. 601 S.W.2d at 71. The court recognized that its reasoning might conflict with the
holding in Nichols v. Houston Police Officers' Pension Bd., 335 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1960, writ ref d n.r.e.). 601 S.W.2d at 71.
418. Jackson v. City of Houston, 595 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
419. Wolfe v. City of Houston, 595 S.W.2d 909, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
420. Scott v. City of Houston, 595 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
421. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
422. 603 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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pany, a real estate developer seeking to plat a new project, was informed
by Missouri City that the plat would be approved only when Berg com-
plied with Missouri City's park dedication ordinance. This ordinance re-
quired a developer of a residential subdivision to dedicate land within the
subdivision for public park purposes, or, at Missouri City's option, to pay
the fair market value of the land to the city in cash.423 Berg refused to
comply and brought suit claiming that the city had exceeded its power as a
municipality and had violated the United States and Texas Constitu-
tions.424 Missouri City then elected to receive money, calculated at
$22,462.50, in lieu of property, and Berg deposited this sum in an escrow
account. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed with the trial
court, which granted the city's motion.425 The court of civil appeals re-
versed and rendered judgment for Berg, holding that the ordinance was
not a valid exercise of the city's police power and constituted a taking
without compensation in violation of article 1, section 17 of the Texas
Constitution.4 26 The court stated that the ordinance did not merely regu-
late the use of Berg's property but rather involved a property loss to Berg
not common to the general public that could not be accomplished without
compensation. 427 The court further indicated that the ordinance would be
void even if the "cash in lieu of realty" provision was not a part of the
ordinance; the court believed that the dedication of property for recrea-
tional purposes did not bear a substantial relation to the safety and health
of the community, but rather constituted too intrusive an encroachment on
personal property rights to be allowed without compensation.428
IX. MISCELLANEOUS CHALLENGES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION
The courts considered a variety of challenges to the actions of local gov-
ernments during the survey period that are not easily categorized. Three
of the more interesting are discussed herein.
County Police Protection. Weber v. City of Sachse429 involved a challenge
to the actions of the Dallas County commissioners' court and the Dallas
423. Id. at 274. There was no provision in the ordinance requiring that cash so acquired
be used to purchase new park areas or that any such areas purchased be located in or near
the subdivision. Id.
424. The plaintiff asserted violations of U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, and TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 17. 603 S.W.2d at 274.
425. 603 S.W.2d at 273.
426. Id. at 275.
427. Id. The court applied the general principle stated in City of Austin v. Teague, 570
S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex. 1978), in which the Texas Supreme Court said:
We held that a government's correction of something that is a "detriment to
the public" or a mere "regulation" indicates that compensation should not be
allowed. DuPuy stated, on the other hand, that proof of a "taking," or of
property loss to the owner "not common to the general public," indicates that
the government should pay for the owner's loss.
Id. (citing DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tex. 1965)).
428. 603 S.W.2d at 275.
429. 591 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
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County sheriff in ending the routine patrolling of incorporated areas of
the county by sheriff's deputies. The commissioners' court terminated
funding for twenty sheriffs deputies, who the sheriff had said were neces-
sary to patrol the incorporated areas of Dallas County. Several Dallas
County municipalities then obtained an order in district court permanently
enjoining the sheriffs department from reducing the number of deputies
patrolling within their boundaries and requiring the commissioners' court
to fund these patrols.430 The Dallas court of civil appeals reversed and
vacated the injunction, holding: (1) that the district court could not com-
pel the commissioners' court to fund certain deputy positions because this
would invade the discretion of the commissioners' court to determine how
county funds are to be expended;431 (2) that the commissioners had com-
plied with article 6869d,432 which the court interpreted as requiring the
commissioners to fund a county police force of not less than six patrolmen
devoted entirely to patrolling those parts of the county outside the county
seat, but as not requiring any particular level of funding to provide a cer-
tain level of protection;433 (3) that a sheriffs decisions as to the deployment
of officers within a county are discretionary, that a sheriff has no
mandatory duty to supply a certain level of law enforcement to municipal-
ities, and that the district court erred in requiring that a certain level of law
enforcement be supplied; 434 and (4) that the district court erred in requir-
ing the defendants to provide the same law enforcement to the plaintiffs as
was provided to unincorporated areas of Dallas County, because a rational
basis existed for this division of service. 435 The court reasoned that the
commissioners could reasonably determine that the law enforcement
budget must be cut, and that the commissioners and sheriff then could
reasonably determine that service to municipalities, which could tax their
citizens to provide their own protection, be curtailed when implementing
the budget cut.4 3 6
School Services to the Handicapped. The Fifth Circuit read liberally the
duty of a school district receiving federal funds to provide services to
handicapped children in an important decision, Tatro v. State of Texas.437
Amber Tatro, a four-year-old child, suffered from spina bifida, a congeni-
430. Id. at 565.
431. Id. at 565-66. The court relied on the rule that though a district court may enjoin an
illegal or unconstitutional act, Sterrett v. Gibson, 168 S.W. 16, 18 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1914, no writ), it may not direct a public official how to perform a discretionary act.
Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. 1971). 591 S.W.2d at 566.
432. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6869d (Vernon 1960) mandates a county police
force of at least six patrolmen in counties of 210,000 or more population.
433. 591 S.W.2d at 566-67.
434. Id. at 567.
435. Id at 567-68. Thus the court found that the plaintiffs were not denied the equal
protection of the laws and the defendants had not abused their discretion in fulfilling the law
enforcement duty imposed upon them by TEX. CODE CRIM, PROC. ANN. art. 2.17 (Vernon
1977). 591 S.W.2d at 567-68.
436. 591 S.W.2d at 567-68. The court also noted that sheriff's deputies would still answer
calls by the citizens of the plaintiff municipalities. Id. at 568.
437. 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980).
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tal defect that prevented her from being able to empty her bladder volun-
tarily and caused orthopedic and speech handicaps. As a result of the
bladder problem Amber had to be catheterized every three to four hours.
In 1979 Amber became eligible for participation in the early childhood
development program of the Irving Independent School District. The
school district was bound by the requirements of the Education for An
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA).438 Pursuant to the EAHCA, the
school district developed an individualized education plan439 for Amber.
The plan stipulated that Amber would receive physical and speech ther-
apy, but did not provide that she would receive treatment for the bladder
problem even though a relatively simple procedure, Clean Intermittent
Catheterization (CIC), was available to perform the needed catheteriza-
tion.440 After exhausting state remedies,441 Amber's parents brought suit
in federal district court, contending that the school district had violated the
EAHCA as well as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 442 The
district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to
require the school district to provide CIC, and the plaintiffs appealed. 443
The Fifth Circuit vacated the denial of the injunction and remanded the
case, holding that the district court had erred, but at the same time stating
that the circuit's ruling did not mean that school districts had to provide
any and all services needed by a handicapped child to allow the child to be
educated with children who are not handicapped. 4" In the court's view
the legal issue, whether CIC was a "related service" that the school district
was required to provide Amber,445 hinged on whether CIC was a "sup-
portive service" necessary to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education.446 The district court had held that CIC was not a "re-
438. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
439. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1976).
440. The trial court had not made findings of fact, and the circuit's discussion was predi-
cated upon the proposed stipulation of facts presented to the trial court by the plaintiffs. The
district court was to make appropriate findings on remand and apply the legal framework
outlined by the circuit. 625 F.2d at 558 n.l. On remand, the district court, in an interim
order, ruled that Amber was entitled to have Irving provide CIC. Tatro v. Texas, No. 79-
1281-G (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 1980).
441. State remedies required by the Act are detailed at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(a)-(c) (1976).
442. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979).
443. 625 F.2d at 560.
444. Id. at 562-63.
445. Id. at 561-62. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976), provides in part that: "In order to qualify for
assistance under this subchapter in any fiscal year, a State shall demonstrate to the Commis-
sioner that the following conditions are met: (1) The State has in effect a policy that assures
all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." Id. § 1401(18)
defines "free appropriate public education" as:
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet
the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate pre-
school, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
446. 625 F.2d at 562. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) defines "related services" as:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive serv-
ices (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physi-
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lated service," concluding that a literal reading of the statute would re-
quire a school district to provide every life support system necessary to
keep a handicapped child in school.447 The circuit court pointed out that
the statute itself limited the types of life support services that are required
as related services. 44 8 For example, the court noted that a school district
did not have to provide life support services that could be performed
before or after school hours, or that must be performed by a physician. 44 9
The court emphasized, moreover, that Congress had mandated that hand-
icapped children should be educated in regular classrooms to the maxi-
mum extent possible, and held that the EAHCA statutory language
"'supportive services. . . as may be required to assist a handicapped child
to benefit from special education' must be read literally to include the pro-
vision of CIC to Amber Tatro. ' '450 The court also held that section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973451 required the school district to provide
CIC to Amber Tatro.452 Citing its decision in Camenisch v. University of
Texas,453 the circuit distinguished the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Southeastern Community College v. Davis 454 by saying that South-
eastern Community College held" 'only that Section 504 does not require a
school to provide services to a handicapped individual for a program for
which the individual's handicap precludes him from ever realizing the
principal benefits of the training.' -455 With the provision of CIC, Amber
would be able to perform well in school; without it she would be unable to
participate. This exclusion, the court said, is expressly condemned by sec-
tion 504.456
Powers of County Auditors Vis-4- Vis Commissioners' Courts. The often
complicated relationship between Texas county officials was highlighted in
Commissioners Court v. Fullerton 457 a case involving the relative powers
cal and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services,
except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation pur-
poses only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of
handicapping conditions in children.
447. 625 F.2d at 562.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 563.
450. Id. at 564.
451. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979) provides: "No otherwise qualified handicapped
individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .
452. 625 F.2d at 564.
453. 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring the university to provide a deaf graduate
student sign language interpreter services).
454. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
455. 625 F.2d at 564.
456. Id. The court was careful to note the limitations on this rule: (1) section 504 does
not require substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond those necessary to elimi-
nate discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals; (2) section 504 "possibly" does
not require the provision of services that would impose undue financial and administrative
burdens upon the service provider. Id. at 564-65 n. 19.
457. 596 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e).
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of the county auditor, the commissioners' court and the district judges. In
1977 the Harris County auditor, as required by state law, requested the
Harris County commissioners' court to solicit and approve bids for certain
improvements and equipment for a computer used by the auditor. This
request and a similar request made in 1978 were never granted. In 1978
Harris County completed a new administration building to which the au-
ditor moved his offices. The auditor requested that the commissioners'
court entertain bids to transfer his computer to the new offices, and the
commissioners' court responded by ordering the auditor to sell the com-
puter and send his computer operations to a separate department of Har-
ris County controlled solely by the commissioners' court. The auditor did
not comply with the order, and his computer remained at his old offices.
Next, the auditor's 1979 budget was approved by the district judges of
Harris County and was submitted to the commissioner's court, which re-
duced the budget by $380,324 and deleted from the budget equipment that
included several computer-related items. The county auditor again re-
quested the disputed services and equipment, and the commissioners'
court responded by ordering the termination of certain contracts and serv-
ices involving the auditor's computer. Shortly thereafter the auditor
brought suit against the commissioners' court for mandamus and injunc-
tive relief as well as for a declaratory judgment to determine his autonomy
vis-A-vis the commissioners' court. The trial court directed a verdict for
the auditor, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. 4 58 The court of civil
appeals noted that county auditors are invested by law with important in-
dependent administrative duties and held that articles 1650, 1656, and
1656a 459 specifically grant auditors authority to decide upon a system for
keeping the county accounts and to provide themselves with the necessary
equipment.460 The court concluded:
We think it is clear that when the county auditor presents his budget
to commissioners court enumerating equipment which he deems nec-
essary for the operation of his office, the commissioners court can re-
view and reject his budget only to the extent that the specific cost of
an enumerated item is excessive or unreasonable in its monetary de-
mands upon county funds, available or to become available, subject to
any abuse of discretion. Commissioners court cannot prescribe the
system of accounting nor what equipment the county auditor must use
in the operation of his office. 46 1
The court examined the record and found no evidence that the auditor's
requests for equipment had been unreasonable.462 Of interest is the court's
holding that the commissioners' court's actions designed to transfer audit-
ing functions to another county department were an improper intrusion on
458. Id. at 579.
459. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1650, 1656-1656a (Vernon 1962 & Supp. 1980-
1981).
460. 596 S.W.2d at 577.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 578.
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the auditor's office, powers, and duties, despite evidence that central com-
puter systems in Dallas and Tarrant Counties had saved money. 463
X. TORT LIABILITY
At common law persons injured as a result of government actions were
normally precluded from recovery, but the walls of this governmental im-
munity have slowly crumbled through the years.464 In Texas, while the
walls still stand, they do so considerably less majestically. It has long been
the rule that a municipality is liable for torts occurring in the performance
of a "proprietary" as opposed to a "governmental" function.465 Courts
have found an express waiver of governmental immunity in article I, sec-
tion 17 of the Texas Constitution,466 which provides that no person's
property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for a public purpose with-
out adequate compensation.467 In some instances too, public employees
and officers may be individually liable at state law. 468 A major blow to
governmental immunity was delivered in 1970 by the enactment of the
Texas Tort Claims Act,4 6 9 which waived the immunity in certain specified
circumstances. Further, the federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
is now widely employed by plaintiffs asserting violations of their federal
rights by local governments and their employees. 470 Many unanswered
questions remain in each of these areas, and one can expect a constant
struggle between the inventive plaintiffs lawyer and the government attor-
ney attempting to hide behind what remains of the immunity. The cur-
rent survey period witnessed several examples of this struggle, and various
cases pointed to the need for extreme care by the plaintiffs attorney at-
tempting to negotiate this convoluted area of law.
Municipal Liability for Performance of Proprietary Functions. In Jezek v.
City of Midland471 the Texas Supreme Court considered a situation within
463. Id. at 579. The court affirmed the judgment for the auditor but did not agree that
the approval of the auditor's equipment budget by the district judges was required by law.
Id. at 580.
464. See generally Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEXAs L. REV. 462
(1971); Tartt & Vernon, Tort Suits Against Government Entities, 38 TEX. B.J. 329 (1975).
465. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1923); Dilley v. City of
Houston, 148 Tex. 191, 193, 222 S.W.2d 992, 993 (1949); City of Houston v. Quinones, 142
Tex. 282, 285-86, 177 S.W.2d 259, 261 (1944); City of Tyler v. Ingram, 139 Tex. 600, 605, 164
S.W.2d 516, 519 (1942); Treadaway v. Whitney Independent School Dist., 205 S.W.2d 97, 99
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, no writ).
466. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
467. See Bragg v. City of Dallas, 605 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no
writ).
468. See 13 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 293.02[9][a] (1981).
469. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980-1981).
470. See Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 781 n.3 (1979).
471. 605 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1980). See also City of Wichita Falls v. Ramos, 596 S.W.2d
654, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (city of Wichita Falls had a
duty to an employee who was inspecting property to exercise ordinary care to discover the




the proprietary branch of the "proprietary-governmental" function dichot-
omy. The court extended the "close proximity rule" 472 to allow recovery
by an injured person when a city knowingly maintains an intersection
right-of-way in a manner that dangerously obstructs the vision of motor-
ists using the street and fails to warn of this danger or to make safe the
dangerous condition.473 Jezek, driving north on a street in the city of Mid-
land, drove a few feet into the east-west road at an intersection to see if
cars were approaching, because his vision was impaired by a thick growth
of trees and brush on the unimproved portion of the intersection. Jezek
was hit by a vehicle driving east, and his minor son, a passenger, sustained
injuries that resulted in irreversible brain damage. There was testimony
that Midland knew of the hazard, but had done nothing to rectify it be-
cause it believed the streets in question were not dedicated to public use.
Despite jury findings favorable to Jezek, the trial court rendered a take-
nothing judgment.474 The court of civil appeals affirmed, relying on the
holding of Ynsfram v. Burkhart475 that a governmental entity owes no duty
to remove visual obstructions existing on an unimproved portion of a
street.
476
The supreme court reversed, noting the well-established rule that the
safe maintenance of streets is a proprietary function and that a city is liable
for its negligence in performing this function.477 The court noted further
that the duty of safe maintenance is not limited to the traveled portion of
the street, but by the close proximity rule extends also to the prevention of
defects outside the traveled or improved portion if the defect's proximity to
the traveled portion makes it probable that the defect will injure those us-
ing the improved portion.478 The court declared that there was no rational
basis for distinguishing between physical obstructions, which were covered
by the close proximity rule, and visual obstructions, which the court of
civil appeals had decided were not covered by the rule.479 The court care-
fully pointed out, however, that a city must have notice of the danger and
negligently fail to act before liability attaches,480 and that the court's deci-
sion would not affect the duties of counties, which perform no proprietary
functions under Texas law.481
Torts Based on the Texas Constitution. Two interesting cases decided dur-
ing the survey period involved the question of the nature of torts based
directly on article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. 482 In Steele v.
472. The "close proximity rule" allows recovery against municipalities for accidents
caused by physical defects within the street right-of-way. 605 S.W.2d at 545.
473. Id. at 548.
474. Id. at 545.
475. 247 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
476. 586 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979).
477. 605 S.W.2d at 546.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 548.
481. Id. at 547.
482. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 provides in part: "No person's property shall be taken,
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City of Houston483 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the no "destruc-
tion" without compensation clause of article I, section 17, and for the first
time definitively outlined the elements of a cause of action for the destruc-
tion of property. The owner and the tenants of a house in Houston sued
the city for damages sustained when Houston police officers destroyed the
house and their belongings while attempting to recapture three escaped
convicts who had taken refuge in the house. The claim was brought under
the Tort Claims Act, as a nuisance and as a destruction of property com-
pensable under article I, section 17. The trial court sustained Houston's
motion for summary judgment, and the court of civil appeals affirmed.484
The supreme court reversed and remanded for trial, holding that the
plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for the destruction of their property
under article I, section 17. 48s The court reviewed the history of article I,
section 17, noting that the provision's requirement that a person's property
not be "damaged" without compensation constituted an expansion of gov-
ernmental duty when added to the Constitution in 1876; the language for-
bidding the "destruction" of property without compensation was added at
the same time.486 Previously the Constitution had forbidden only a "tak-
ing" without compensation.487 The court examined the sparse case au-
thority considering the "destruction clause" and then stated the
requirements for the "destruction of property" action in the case before it:
(1) Houston, acting through its officers with authority or color of authority;
(2) must have intentionally set the house on fire or prevented the fire's
extinguishment; and (3) the destruction must have been "for or applied to
public use. ' 488 The court said that the "for public use" element distin-
guished the "destruction of property" action from a negligence action and
further said that the destruction would be for the public use if Houston
ordered the destruction because of a real or supposed emergency to appre-
hend dangerous armed men.489 The court rejected Houston's invocation
of governmental immunity490 as well as its claim that the police power
excused its action.491 It did recognize the possibility that Houston might
establish a defense based upon proof of "great public necessity," but held
out little hope that under the facts such a defense would succeed.492
A plaintiff caught in the snares of governmental immunity made a val-
iant effort to escape, including making a claim for nuisance under article I,
damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being
made, unless by the consent of such person .
483. 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980).
484. 577 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979).
485. 603 S.W.2d at 793.
486. Id. at 790.
487. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1845).
488. 603 S.W.2d at 791-92.
489. Id. at 792.
490. Id. at 791. The court stated that the Texas Constitution itself authorizes compensa-
tion for the destruction of property and is "a waiver of governmental immunity for the
taking, damaging or destruction of property for public use." Id.
491. Id. at 792-93.
492. Id. at 792.
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section 17, but ultimately failed in Bragg v. City of Dallas.493 Bragg sued
the city of Dallas for damages to his airplane that occurred when he was
on a taxiway at Dallas Love Field, a municipal airport. On appeal from a
summary judgment granted Dallas by the trial court, the Dallas court of
civil appeals held that Bragg was foreclosed from suing Dallas based upon
a breach of a proprietary duty because the maintenance of a municipal
airport is a governmental function protected by the governmental immu-
nity to tort liability.494 In search of a cause of action Bragg alleged a nui-
san*ce, which in certain circumstances has been held to be an exception to
the rule of immunity for acts done in furtherance of a governmental func-
tion. The court's review of the law revealed only two exceptions to this
immunity rule: (1) the Tort Claims Act 495 expressly waives the immunity
in certain circumstances, and (2) article I, section 17496 also waives the
immunity where a person's property is taken, damaged, or destroyed for a
public purpose without compensation. 497 Although Bragg made his nui-
sance claim under article I, section 17, the court nevertheless found the
constitutional waiver to apply to nuisances only in the sense of "mainte-
nance of facilities or conditions on municipal property which interfere
with the enjoyment of neighboring land, as by a sewage disposal plant or
refuse dump which produces offensive odors. ' 498 The court concluded
that a condition on municipal land that is dangerous topersons coming on
the land is not a "nuisance" so as to provide an exception to governmental
immunity, and decided that the same rule should apply to a condition haz-
ardous or dangerous to vehicles coming on municipal land.499 Bragg
therefore had no cause of action.
Texas Tort Claims Act. The Texas Supreme Court delivered one decision
construing the Tort Claims Act5°° during the survey period. In Turvey v.
City of Houston50 1 the plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained when the vehicle he was operating struck a hole in
a Houston street. The maintenance of streets is a proprietary function of a
city, which, if negligently performed, will sustain a common law cause of
action for resulting damages. 50 2 Turvey was barred from making this
claim, however, because he had failed to give the notice required by the
Houston City Charter. He therefore sought to bring his action under the
Tort Claims Act. Turvey based his claim on section 18(b) of the Act,
which provides that a "unit of government" shall owe a claimant a "duty
493. 605 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
494. Id. at 671. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-15 (Vernon 1969) declares the
maintenance and operation of municipal airports to be governmental functions.
495. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980-1981).
496. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
497. 605 S.W.2d at 671.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 672.
500. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980-1981).
501. 602 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1980).
502. Id. at 518-19 (citing City of Austin v. Daniels, 160 Tex. 628, 335 S.W.2d 753 (1960)).
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to warn of special defects such as excavations or obstructions on highways,
roads or streets .... -503 The Act's definition of "unit of government" in-
cludes cities,5°4 but the supreme court, relying upon section 18(a) of the
Act,505 which provides that the Act "shall not apply to any proprietary
function of a municipality," held that Houston was not liable under the
Act for negligent acts arising out of its proprietary functions, such as the
street maintenance defect Turvey challenged.506 The court distinguished
County of Harris v. Eaton ,507 in which it had held a county responsible for
an abnormally large hole under the "special defect" language of section
18(b), on the ground that Eaton involved a county, which performs no
proprietary functions and therefore would not be liable at common law for
street defects.508 The Turvey court was careful to point out that its holding
in no way affected a municipality's continued common law liability for
proprietary functions.50 9
Turvey highlights the continuing importance of the distinction between
proprietary functions and governmental functions where municipalities
are involved, particularly with regard to the different procedural steps nec-
essary to present common law claims and claims under the Act. Careful
lawyers will pay close attention to this distinction, as well as to the notice
requirements of the city (normally contained in the city charter), when an
action against a municipality is contemplated.
Decisions from the courts of civil appeals illustrate the significance of
the Turvey result and the possible pitfalls the attorney representing a
claimant must avoid. In LaBove v. City of Groves510 the plaintiffs brought
suit for property damage and personal injuries sustained when their auto-
mobile struck a partially open manhole in the city of Groves. The Groves
City Charter made the submission of a verified notice within sixty days of
an accident a condition precedent to city liability.51' Plaintiffs' counsel
timely notified the Groves city manager by letter, but the letter was unveri-
fied and did not contain all the required information. Nonetheless, the city
was on actual notice because, in addition to the letter, numerous city per-
sonnel arrived at the accident scene shortly after the accident occurred.
The plaintiffs made claims under the common law and under the Tort
Claims Act. The Beaumont court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment for Groves, citing Turvey512 for the proposition that no
503. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 18(b) (Vernon 1970).
504. Id. § 2(l).
505. Id. § 18(a).
506. 602 S.W.2d at 519-20.
507. 573 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. 1978).
508. 602 S.W.2d at 519-20.
509. Id. at 520.
510. 602 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 608
S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1980).
511. Id. at 396. The notice also was required to include the names of witnesses, the
extent of the injury, and other information. Id.
512. See notes 501-09 supra and accompanying text. The court cited Turvey's holding
that a city is not liable under the Act for the negligent performance of a proprietary function
such as street maintenance. 602 S.W.2d at 396-97.
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claim could arise under the Act.513 The court further held that strict com-
pliance with the city charter notice provision was required to support the
common law claim, and that neither the unverified notice of the acci-
dent5 14 nor the city's actual knowledge of the accident 515 were sufficient.5 16
A similar result was reached in Arico-Bell Corp. v. City of Temple.5 17
Artco-Bell sued the city of Temple for damages to its truck caused by the
truck's collision with a tree limb overhanging a city street. Temple filed a
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Artco-Bell had failed to
comply with the city charter by not filing with the city manager a verified
notice of the property damage and by not giving notice of any kind to the
mayor or city manager that a dangerous condition existed. Timely letters
were sent by Artco-Bell's president and its lawyer to the city, notifying the
city manager of the collision, but the letters were not verified. The trial
court granted the motion for summary judgment, and the Austin court of
civil appeals affirmed. 518  Artco-Bell argued that the overhanging tree
limb was a special defect within section 14(12) of the Act 519 and that there-
fore the actual notice received by Temple was sufficient. 520 Citing
Turvey,521 the court held that the Act notice provisions had no applicabil-
ity to Artco-Bel's claim, because the claim related to a proprietary func-
tion of the city.522 The court also held that the notice to the city had to be
verified in order to be effective, 523 and that Temple had not waived and
was not estopped from asserting the lack of verification, although Temple's
attorney had responded to Artco-Bel's notification letters with his own
letter stating that he would place Artco-Bell's claim before the city com-
513. 602 S.W.2d at 396-97.
514. Id. at 397. The court distinguished McDonald v. City of Houston, 577 S.W.2d 800
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), as involving a situation in
which the only deficiency in the notice was a lack of verification. 602 S.W.2d at 397. How-
ever, the LaBove court also appears to question McDonald in that the Act's actual notice
exception appears to be utilized in a proprietary case. Id. McDonald seems to conflict with
the majority of Texas decisions considering the question of notice in a proprietary case, and
it remains to be seen whether other Texas courts will follow its more liberal approach. See
Hughes, 'Wotice of Claim " as a Condition Precedent to Suit.- Is the Proprietary- Governmental
Distinction Important?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 427, 436-41 (1979).
515. 602 S.W.2d at 397.
516. Id. at 396-97.
517. 603 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ granted).
518. Id at 388.
519. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(12) (Vernon 1970).
520. Id. § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides:
Except where there is actual notice on the part of the governmental unit that
death has occurred or that the claimant has received some injury or that prop-
erty of the claimant has been damaged, any person making a claim hereunder
shall give notice of the same to the governmental unit against which such
claim is made, reasonably describing the damage or injury claimed and the
time, manner and place of the incident from which it arose, within six months
from the date of the incident. Provided, however, except where there is such
actual notice, charter and ordinance provisions of cities requiring notice
within a charter period permitted by law are hereby expressly ratified and
approved.
521. See notes 501-09 supra and accompanying text.
522. 603 S.W.2d at 387.
523. Id.
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mission upon receipt of a proper claim form.524
The plaintiffs were more fortunate in City of Houston v. Deshotel.525 An
accident caused by a city of Houston garbage truck resulted in injuries to
the plaintiffs. Though the Houston City Charter required the plaintiffs to
give the city a verified notice of the injury, the plaintiffs' attorney sent an
unverified notice to the city apprising it of the injury. The trial court en-
tered judgment for the plaintiffs, but the court of civil appeals reversed. 526
The court stated that it was well settled in Texas that the Houston verifica-
tion requirement was a condition precedent to a suit based on negligence
in performing a proprietary function and that the "actual notice" excep-
tion provided by the Tort Claims Act5 27 did not apply where a proprietary
function was involved.528 The parties had stipulated that the action in-
volved a proprietary function. Fortunately for the plaintiffs, however, the
court appears to have given them a second chance by remanding the case
for a new trial.529 The court pointed out that the disposal of garbage is a
governmental rather than a proprietary function and stated that the stipu-
lation regarding proprietary function was not binding on the parties or the
-court because it amounted to a stipulation of a legal conclusion.530
In a case involving the "actual notice" exception of the Act,531 the court
in Collier v. City of Texas City532 reversed the trial court's grant of Texas
City's motion for summary judgment, which had been based on the ab-
sence of any formal written notice to the city of the plaintiff's accident.533
The plaintiff, a Texas City employee, was injured while attempting to free
a compactor stuck in the Texas City landfill. Because a governmental
function was involved,5 34 the court of civil appeals considered whether
Texas City had "actual knowledge" of the injury pursuant to section 16 of
the Act;535 that Texas City had received no written notice was conceded.
The court followed other courts in interpreting'the actual notice exception
to require that the local government have information "reasonably
describing the damage or injury claimed and the time, manner and place
of the incident from which it arose. ' 536 Applying this standard, the court
found Texas City's actual knowledge more than sufficient: city employees,
including the director of public works, actually witnessed the accident and
524. Id. at 387-88. The court found that the city's attorney had no duty to point out
defects in a claim. Id. at 388.
525. 585 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
526. Id. at 851.
527. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see note
520 supra.
528. 585 S.W.2d at 849.
529. Id. at 851.
530. Id. at 849.
531. See note 520 supra.
532. 598 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
533. Id. at 357.
534. As indicated in City of Houston v. Deshotel, 585 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ), the disposal of garbage is a governmental function.
535. See note 520 supra.
536. 598 S.W.2d at 358.
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were aware that the plaintiff was missing work and receiving medical treat-
ment. 53
7
The courts of civil appeals considered certain other Act issues during the
survey period. Three of the more important cases are summarized
herein.5 38 Forbus v. City of Denton5 39 involved an application of the dis-
tinction between formulation of policy and implementation of policy es-
tablished by the Texas Supreme Court in State v. Terrell.5 40 The family
members of a prisoner named Forbus sued the city of Denton and others
for wrongful death allegedly caused by Denton's failure to search and su-
pervise Forbus properly and to provide Forbus a fire retardant mattress.
Forbus had set the mattress in his cell on fire and died several days later
from the bums he received and the toxic fumes he inhaled. Denton re-
ceived a summary judgment from the trial court on the sole ground that
sovereign immunity had not been waived by the Act because of the exemp-
tion provided by section 14(9) of the Act. 54' Based on section 14(9),
Denton had argued that the claims of the Forbus family (1) were con-
nected with an act of civil disobedience and (2) arose out of the "method of
providing" police protection. The court of civil appeals reversed and re-
manded for trial and held that the "civil disobedience" exception was in-
applicable because the incident in question was the act of Forbus alone
and did not involve "a large number of persons acting unlawfully in con-
cert.",542 With regard to the "method of providing police protection" ex-
ception, the court applied the Terrell test,543 which provides that the
exception maintains governmental immunity for negligence related to the
formulation of policy but not for negligence related to the implementation
of policy.544 The court held that Denton's decision as to which type of
mattress to use related to the implementation of policy and that Denton
was therefore not immune from a negligence attack.545
In Callaway v. City of Odessa546 the El Paso court of civil appeals con-
sidered a claim by the Callaways against the city of Odessa for damages
resulting from the backup of sewage into their home. After previous
problems, at which times Odessa had been notified, a major backup
flooded the Callaways' entire home with two to three inches of sewage,
537. Id. at 358-59.
538. See also Keiffer v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
(federal district court has ancillary jurisdiction over third-party claim for contribution
under Tort Claims Act, even though claim was not brought in the federal district in which
the cause of action arose).
539. 595 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
540. 588 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1979).
541. 595 S.W.2d at 622. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(9) (Vernon
1970) provides that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to "[a]ny claim based on an
injury or death connected with any act or omission arising out of civil disobedience, riot,
insurrection or rebellion or arising out of the failure to provide, or the method of providing,
police or fire protection."
542. 595 S.W.2d at 623.
543. 588 S.W.2d at 788.
544. 595 S.W.2d at 623.
545. Id.
546. 602 S.W.2d 330 (Tex., Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
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causing considerable property damage, annoyance, and discomfort. The
trial court rendered a take nothing verdict for Odessa notwithstanding a
jury verdict for the Callaways; 547 the jury found that Odessa had negli-
gently maintained the sewer line and that the sewer line was a nuisance.
The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had demon-
strated no compensable nuisance because the gravamen of the Callaways'
complaint was negligence and there had been no showing that the sewer
pipe was inherently dangerous. 548 The court further held that the Cal-
laways could not recover damages as a result of any waiver of governmen-
tal immunity provided by the Tort Claims Act.549 The court noted that
damages to property could not be recovered under a provision providing
waiver of immunity for death or personal injuries arising out of the condi-
tion or use of property, 550 and held that the annoyance and discomfort
suffered by the Callaways was not compensable as a personal injury.551
Billstrom v. Memorial Medical Center5 52 involved the difficult distinction
under the Act between a defective or negligent "condition or use of tangi-
ble property" and a "premise defect." The distinction is important be-
cause the liability established by the provision in section 3 of the Act, that
a government is responsible as if it were a private person for death or
personal injuries caused by "some condition or some use of tangible prop-
erty, real or personal,"5 53 is subject to certain exceptions. One such excep-
tion is contained in section 18(b), 554 which provides that as to a "premise
defect" a government will only owe a claimant the duty a private person
would owe a licensee on private property, unless payment has been made
by the claimant for the use of the premises. The person injured by a
"premise defect" will therefore be owed a lesser duty than a person injured
by a defective or negligent condition or use of property.
In Billstrom the plaintiff alleged that her legal ward, a mentally dis-
turbed patient, who was being kept in a seventh-floor security room at the
defendant medical center's psychiatric unit, was able to remove a security
screen from an unlocked window, and fell while attempting to leave the
hospital, sustaining permanent physical and mental injuries. The plaintiff
547. Id. at 331.
548. Id. at 332-33. The court engages in an interesting discussion of the "nuisance" ex-
ception to governmental immunity without mentioning a constitutional basis for the excep-
tion. Id. at 333. It may be useful to compare the Dallas court of civil appeals' discussion in
Bragg v. City of Dallas, 605 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ), in which the
nuisance exception is described in more narrow terms. Id. at 671-72.
549. 602 S.W.2d at 334. The court also rejected the Callaways' claim that because some
rain water entered the sewer system the system was used in a proprietary function of govern-
ment. Id. at 333. The court noted that the city's sanitary sewer and storm sewer systems
were separate and distinct. Id. The Callaways' argument reflects the artificialities of the
governmental/proprietary distinction; in Texas a sanitary sewer system is a governmental
function but a storm sewer system is a proprietary function.
550. Id. at 334; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
551. 602 S.W.2d at 334.
552. 598 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
553. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. AN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
554. Id. § 18(b) (Vernon 1970).
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further alleged that the window and security screen involved were defec-
tive, harmful, and not properly installed and maintained, and that the
medical center should have known and foreseen that such an accident
might occur. Plaintiff specifically sought recovery for negligence in con-
nection with the "condition and use of personal or real property. ' 555 The
medical center moved for summary judgment on the ground that the ac-
tion was in reality based upon premises defects and that there was no alle-
gation or showing that the hospital had breached any duty that a licensee
would have to the patient. The trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment, but the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals reversed. 556 The
court concluded that the window and screen would be considered premises
defects within both the common and legal definitions of the words, in that
the plaintiffs allegations dealt "with a defect in an appurtenance to a room
itself, rather than a defect in a distinct piece of equipment, irrespective of
whether or not that piece of equipment is classified as a fixture. ' 557 The
court found, however, that the granting of the motion for summary judg-
ment was improper because: (1) the plaintiff should have been given an
opportunity to replead; (2) a fact issue was raised by deposition testimony
indicating that the hospital may have had actual prior knowledge of the
screen's defective condition, in which case a licensor would have a duty
under Texas law to warn the licensee of the defect or make the condition
reasonably safe; and (3) there may have been a fact issue as to whether the
hospital intended to treat the patient as a paying patient or whether the
patient was indigent, in which case the section 18(b) exception might not
apply.558
Liability under 42 US C, Section 1983. Many of the claims that local gov-
ernments face in federal court are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C., section
1983, which provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 559
In Dean v. Gladney560 the Fifth Circuit decided that the limitations
placed on a section 1983 action by Monell v. Department of Social Serv-
ices561 could not be avoided by bringing a Bivens-type action562 directly
555. 598 S.W.2d at 644-45.
556. Id. at 648.
557. Id. at 646-47.
558. Id. at 647-48. On motion for rehearing, the court discussed the difficult question of
when nonuse of property will support a suit otherwise barred by governmental immunity.
Id. at 648-49. There is little doubt that future litigation will explore this question.
559. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
560. 621 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1980).
561. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local governing bodies cannot be liable under § 1983 on a
19811
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under the United States Constitution and 28 U.S.C., section 1331.563 The
court also interpreted section 1988, 564 the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act, which permits a district court to award attorneys' fees to a
"prevailing party" as part of the costs of suit in actions brought pursuant to
sections 1981 through 1986.
In Dean the plaintiffs were arrested and jailed on charges of disorderly
conduct or public intoxication after a confrontation between beachgoers
and the police in Brazoria County. The plaintiffs filed suit under section
1983 and directly under the Constitution and section 1331, alleging viola-
tions of their rights under the first, fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amend-
ments. The defendants included the law enforcement officers involved in
the arrests, Brazoria County, the Brazoria County sheriff and his deputy,
and the cities of Angleton, Clute, and Freeport. A jury found that certain
of the officers at the scene of the confrontation had violated certain plain-
tiffs' constitutional rights in bad faith and awarded compensatory and pu-
nitive damages. The district court found as a matter of law that the two
officers against whom damages were awarded were joint tortfeasors and
accordingly entered judgment against them.5 65 The court found no direct
involvement in the challenged actions by the Brazoria County sheriff and
dismissed the cause of action against him. 566 The district court also found
that sovereign immunity protected the county and cities from suit.567 Fi-
nally, the court awarded attorneys' fees of $8,445 against the two deputies
against whom judgments were entered.568 The plaintiffs appealed, alleging
that the district court erred (1) by failing to find the county and cities liable
for their employees' actions, (2) by failing to impose liability for attorneys'
fees on the county and cities, and (3) by failing to consider whether the
attorneys' fees were fixed or contingent, as allegedly required by Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 569 One of the officers cross-appealed,
claiming that the district court erred in holding him jointly and severally
liable for certain damages.
Relying upon decisions in other circuits, matters of fiscal policy, and its
analysis of Bivens and Monell, the Fifth Circuit held that municipal or
county liability on the basis of respondeat superior in a Bivens -type action
respondeat superior basis solely because the government employs a tortfeasor). Monell is
probably better known for establishing that a plaintiff can recover damages from a munici-
pality when the municipality is in some fashion directly involved in the constitutional depri-
vation. See Day & Jacobs, Opening the Deep Pocket-Sovereign Immunity Under Section
1983, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 389 (1979). Previously, municipalities and other local government
entities had been immune from § 1983 liability under the rule of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961).
562. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a cause of
action founded directly on the Constitution against individual federal officers who violated
the plaintiff's constitutional rights).
563. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
564. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
565. 451 F. Supp. 1313, 1321-22 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
566. Id. at 1322.
567. Id. at 1320.
568. Id. at 1324.
569. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
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was not available to the plaintiffs.570 As the court recognized, some vic-
tims of official misconduct might be foreclosed from an effective opportu-
nity to secure compensation for their damages because they will be forced
to sue individual government employees rather than "deep-pocketed"
counties and cities.57' The court also held that attorneys' fees could not be
awarded against the cities and county since these entities had properly
been dismissed from the suit, that the trial judge had considered all the
necessary factors when awarding attorneys' fees and had not abused his
discretion in failing to give any weight to an alleged contingent fee factor,
and that there was no proper basis for awarding damages against the of-
ficers jointly and severally, because the injuries shown were individual to
the particular plaintiffs and could be apportioned with reasonable cer-
tainty between the officers. 572
570. 621 F.2d at 1334-37. This result accords with the circuit's decision in Hearth, Inc. v.
Department of Pub. Welfare, 617 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1980), another Texas case, in which the
court held that it would not imply a Bivens-type action when it appeared that it was possible
to bring the action under § 1983. Id. at 382-83. In Hearth the court stated: "It adds nothing
to appellant's case to assume that a suit under § 1983 would be subject to defenses unique to
the agency and its officials, for such defenses would also be available in the hypothetical
implied Fourteenth Amendment cause of action." Id. at 383. Though the circuit in Dean
leaves open the possibility that the full contours of a Bivens-type action and a § 1983 action
might not be identical, the result augurs ill for a potential claimant against a local govern-
ment who would seek an advantage in one or the other. See 621 F.2d at 1336-37.
571. 621 F.2d at 1337 n.15.
572. Id. at 1337-40.
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